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Schizophrenics, Brain Damaged Patients and Normals 
Gerald s. 0 1 Keefe 
Loyola University of Chicago 
Process and reactive schizophrenics, brain damaged patients 
and normal controls were compared on an optional shift task, in· - , 
which they could either make a reversal or a:non-reversal shift~, 
All the subjects were patients in one of two Veterans Administra-
tion hospitals. The normal controls had been hospitalized for 
various medical reasons, other than psychiatric or neurological 
difficulties. 
Previous research has shown that schizophrenics as a group 
display atypical thought organization, using personal and idiosyn-
cratic constructs. There is also some evidence of more atypical 
thought organization in process schizophrenia than in r~active 
schizophrenia. Process s.chizophrenics have been shown· to be under-
aroused, relative to normals, whereas reactive schizophrenics have 
been shown to be over-aroused,re~ative to normals. Diffusely 
brain damaged subjects pave been shown to have difficulty in learn-
ing abstract concepts and di£ficulty in shifting from one response 
to another when the requirements of the task are changed. Research 
on reversal sh if ts has shown the preference for !"eY-ersal shifts, 
relative to non-reversal shifts, is enhanced by ability to mediate 
and ability to attend to the relevant cues. 
It was predicted that each of the three pathological groups 
would make fewer reversal shifts than the normal group. This 
prediction was confirmed for the process group. It was also pre-
dicted that the reactive schizophrenics would make fewer reversal 
shifts than the process schizophrenics. This prediction was ver-
ified. It was also found that process schizophrenics took more 
trials than normals to learn the initial concept, and the reactive 
schizophrenics and brain damaged subjects require~ more trials than 
normals to learn the shift concept. It was concluded that the 
process schizophrenics were so inattentive to the relevant stimuli 
that they had difficulty in learning the initial concept. Their-
inattentiveness and failure to mediate eliminated the negative as 
well as the positive transfer effects in shifting, and they con- ,. 
sequently shifted with the same ease as normal subjects, who were ... 
affected by both positive and negative transfer. However, since' 
there was no transfer for the process group they made signif i-
cantly fewer reversal shifts than the normal group. In contrast 
to the under-arousal and i-nattentiveness in the process group, the 
reactive groups' performance can be understood in terms of over-
arousal. Because of their heightened.state of arousal they learned 
the initial concept quickly, but were so aroused that they were 
not flexible enough to shift off it. In a similar fashion the · 
brain damage subjects because of their cognitive rigidity were also 
unable to shift. 
For reactive schizophrenics and brain damaged subjects, there 
were significantly more reversal shifts when the initially learned 
concept was color than when it was form. Two interpretations were 
offered for these results. First, color is often thought of as , 
an affective stimuli, and si_nQe previous research has smwn re ... , ~ 
active schizophrenics and brain damaged subjects to be emotion-
ally aroused, it is possible that they may have been attracted 1to 
color, continued to respond to it when it was learned initially 
and shifted to it when form was learned initially. A second ex-
planation is that with the stimuli used, learning the opposite of 
the color concept may have been easier than learning the opposite 
of the form response. Hence the tendency to continue to respond 
to color when it was learned initially, but to frequently cease 
responding to form when it was learned initially may be a function 
of the reactive schizophrenics' and brain damaged subjects' ability 
to make an easy abstraction but not a more difficult one. 
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.Chapter I 
Introduction and Survey of the Literature 
The purpose of the present study is to compare the preference 
for reversal or non-reversal shifts in four groups, process schizo-
phrenics (schizophrenics with a poor premorbid history), reactive 
schizophrenics (schizophrenics with a good premorbid history), 
··"1t . 
'' '> ...
diffusely brain damaged patients, and normals~.· A reversal shift 
1 ' 
is one in which the previ~usly positive stimulus becomes negative 
and the previously negative stimulus becomes positive. In a non-
reversal shift, the p~eviously relevant dimens~on becomes irrele-
vant and the previous irrelevant dimension becomes relevant. 
Previous research has shown that preschool children and 
animals prefer non-reversal shifts, whereas, normal adults prefer 
reversal shifts. The present study hypothesizes that schizophren-
ics, especially process schizophrenics, display a greater prefer-, 
ence for non-reversal shifts than normal controls. This study .al-
so hypothesizes that brain damaged patients differ from normals in 
that they will spow a greater preference for non-reversal· shifts. 
In reviewing the literature studies frcm four areas will be 
examined. First, studies rela:ting to cognitive deficit in schizo-
phrenics will.be reviewed, .than the studies that deal with cogni-
tive deficit in light of the process-reactive distinction will be 
( 
examined. Thirdly, those studies pertaining to cogni t,i ve dif-
ficulties with brain injured patients will be presented. And 
finally, relevant studies on reversal and non-reversal shifts will 
be reviewed. 
-----------------~--------------..._.. _____________________________ _,,.___,, 
2. 
~tndies Dealin~ with Co~nitive Defir.it in Schizonhrenia 
Since there has been voluminous research in this area, a 
focused review of articles most relevant has been performed. For 
the purpose of organization articles are grouped together on the 
basis of what they consider to be the basic area of deficit in 
schizophrenia: abstraction, regression, associative interference, 
overinclusion, or attention. 
Abstraction 
Goldstein (1946) argued that a disturbance of the abstract 
attitude" was the fundamental thinking disorder in schizophrenia. 
The term abstract attitude as used by Goldstein includes'the 
following characteristics: (a) to assume a mental set voluntarily 1 
(b) to shift voluntarily from one aspect of the situation to 
another, (c) to keep in mind simultaneously various aspects, (d) 
. , 
to grasp the essentials of a given whole; to break up a given 
whole into parts and to isolate them voluntarily, (e) to general-
ize; to abstract common properties; to plan ahead ideationally; 
to assume an attitude toward the "mere possible", and to think or 
perform symbolically, (f) to detatch our ego from the outer world. 
Goldstein (1959) stated that both brain damaged patients and 
scfl:izophrenics operate on the basis of the "concrete attitude", 
which is merely a response to immediate sense impression. He 
cited as evidence for this theory the relatively poor perfor~ance 
'--------........ ~-~·-~·-....... -----------
·of schizophrenics on the Goldstein-Scheerer test (Bolles and 
Goldstein, 1938; Goldstein and Scheerer, 1941). In studies with 
the Vigotsky blocks, other investigators also concluded that 
schizophrenics showed impaired ability to form abstract concepts 
(Hanfmann and Kasanin, 1937, 1942; Kasanin, 1946). Fisher (1950), 
however, found that schizophrenics and hysterics did not differ on 
their performance with_ the Vigotsky blocks. 
Buss and Lang (1965) considered the results of these early 
studies inconclusive. They cited the nonquantitative scoring of 
the Goldstein-Scheerer test, the ti~e-help score of the Vigotsky 
test and the lack of adequate control groups as reasons to consider 
Goldstein's hypothesis unproven • 
. . , 
Later :·:+nvestigations, with udeqw::.te control groups, have 
... 
shown that.is~hizophrenics are not abnormally concrete (Adinolfi 
and Barocos,: 1970; Chapman, 1961a; Chapman and Taylor, 1957; Fey, 
1951; Lothrop, 1960; McGaughran, 1954; McGaughran and Moran, 19_56, 
1957; Payne and Hewlett, 196(1; Rashlds, 1947; White, 1949). 
'· Essentially, these studies show that schizophrenics are capable 
of giving abstract responses but the abstract responses they give 
are often personal and idiosyncratic. 
In the studies by McGaughran (1954) and McGaughran and Moran 
1956, 1957), the distinction between the abstract-concrete. 
dimension of conceptual thought and idiosyncratic-shared dimension 
of conceptual thought was spelled out clearly. McGaughran and 
Moran referred to this first dimension as the open-closed dimen-
sion and they called the second dimension the public-private 
4. 
imension. An open concept is an abstract one; a closed concept 
is a concrete one; a public concept is one that is defined-by an 
attribute which is easily communicated to another person; a 
private concept is one that is idiosyncratic and personal. 
McGraughran and Moran found that schizophrenics did not differ 
from normals on the open-closed dimension, but that schizophrenics 
used significantly more private concepts than normals. In compar-
ing brain damaged patients to schizophrenics, they found no 
difference on the public-private dimension, but found that as 
compared to the schiz6phrenics, brain damaged patients were more 
likely to use a closed concept than an open one. 
Regression 
Another early theory advanced regarding schizophrenic think-
ing is that it represents a regression to a previous, less mature 
level. According to this view schizophrenic thinking is "child-
ish" thinking. It should be noted that much of the evidence in 
support of regression may also be taken as supporting the theory 
that schizophrenics are fixated at an early developmental stage, 
that is they have never progressed beyond a certain level. 
Gardner (1931) was one of the first to propose the regression 
hypothesis. However, Cameron was the first to put the regression 
hypothesis to an empirical test. In a series of systematic studie 
of regression, Cameron (1939a, 1938b, 1939, 1944) compared the 
l[~~~:h~:n~cs and psychoti~=ile patients on a test which required them to complete sentences. Cameron's results were 
fmostly negative. He concluded that there were only superficial 
resembances between the language, logic and conceptualization of 
children and schizophrenics. 
Two recent theories stress the central role of regression in 
schizophrenia. Kantor and Wilder have argued that the degree of 
regression is related to the process-reactive distinction, and 
their work will be discussed in a later section dealing with 
process-reactive studies. The other theorist, who stresses the 
importance of regression is Goldman (1962), who has applied 
Werner 1 s~(194o) developnental approach to schizophrenia. 
Werner ( 1 ~O) assumed. that develop:nent mo·.~cs from an unorgan-
, 
ized, undifferentiated, diYfused state to an organized, differ-
entiated, specific state. The key process in developnent is 
differentiation. .J}oldman assumed that in schizophrenia there is 
a regression to earlier developmental stages-those characterized 
by a lack of differentiation, generalized responsivity and 
( ' 
diffusiveness. 
In attempting to parallel the thinking and language of 
children with the thinking and language of schizophrenics Gold-
man stated there were three important dimensions on which 
( 
schizophrenics and children differed from adults. These were 
the development from idiosyncrasy to concensuality of concepts, 
from lability to stability of concepts, and from contextualization 
to autonomy of concepts. 
---------------~;:.._.;.~· ... -~~·-· ..-------------6. 
Goldman's first dimension is essentially the same dimension 
that McGaughran and Moran (1956, 1957) referred to as the public-
private dimension. The McGaughran and Moran studies (!956, 1957) 
and other studies cited above have shown that schizophrenics 
differ from normal adults in that they use significantly more 
private (idiosyncratic) concepts. Goldman (1962) cited evidence 
showing that children also use more idiosyncratic concepts than 
adults. 
Goldman's second dimension, the development from lability to 
stability of concepts$ refers to the tendency to keep a conceptual 
set (stability) or to switch it rapidly (lability). Goldman cited 
Reichard, Schneider and Rapaport (1944) as evidence of children's 
labile use of concepts and cited Goldman (1960) as evidence or· 
schizophrenic's labile use of concepts. Goldman's third dimension 
the development from contextualization to autonomy is the dimensio1 
that McGaughran and Moran (1956, 1957) referred to as the open-
closed dimension. As mentioned above McGaughran and Moran found 
. 
that schizophrenics and normals did not differ on this dimension, 
calling into question the notion that schizophrenics think 
concretely. However, Goldman (1962) argued that schizophrenics• 
concepts are concrete and tied to the stimulus context and cited 
evidence from Arieti,· (1955); Cameron, (1938); Goldman, (1960)~ 
and Kasanin, (1946). However, Buss and Lang (196.5) disputed 
these findings because of the lack of quantification or adequate 
controls. 
As further evidence Goldman noted that schizophrenics tend to 
define words more concretely than normals (Choderkoff and Mussen, 
1952; Feifel, 1949; Flavell, 1956; Harrington and Ehrmann, 1954). 
However, as noted above in the discussion of abstraction, idiosyn-
cratic and bizzare responses tend to be scored as concrete, and 
there is evidence that schizophrenics give abstract concepts. 
Other studies of regression give equivocal evidence. Ells-
worth (1951) found. that children and. schizophrenics were similar 
in the way they used different parts of speech. Burstein (195~, 
1961) found that children and schizophrenics tended to equate 
antoyms with synonyms to a greater extent than normals. Chapnan, 
Burstein, Day and Verdone (1961) gave two different thinking tasks 
to children, schizophrenics and brain damaged patients. On one, 
.. 
task the children resembled the schizophrenics, but not the brain 
damaged patients. On the other task the children resembled the 
brain damaged patients, but not the schizophrenics. Following 
up on Chapman, Chapman and Miller's (1964) finding that schizo-
phrenics responded to the strong aspects of word meanings and 
ignored the weaker, Klarman and Chapman (1969) found that schizo-
phrenics, relative to normal adults, were similar to third and 
fourth grade children, relative to eighth grade children, in that 
they responded to the stronger aspects of the meaning of words 
• 
and ignored the weaker aspects of meaning. 
In summarizing the data on regression, it is necessary to 
conclude that the regression hypothesis is ·lacking in systematic 
support. Gold.man has produced some evidence for equating 
8. 
~ 
~hildren and schizophrenics on the dimensions of idiosyncrasy-
bonsenuali ty and stability-lability. Ellsworth (1951), Burstein 
(1959, 1961); and Klarman and Chapnan (1969) have shown some 
similarities between schizophrenics and children on some language 
and thinking tasks. However Goldman's (1962) assumption that 
schizophrenics, like children, think concretely has little support. 
Other studies on regression, most notably those of Cameron (1938a, 
1938b, 1939, 1944) have also yielded negative results. In addi-
tion to. this, many of the studies that yielded positive results 
may have been biased in that there were not sufficient response 
atternatives, so that any subjects that did not give the correct 
adult answer gave a similar deviate answer. In such a situation 
children and schizophrenics could make the same error but for 
entirely different reasons. 
Although Cameron's studies of regression caused him to reject 
the regression hypothesis, they did lead him to a rather complete 
descriptive understanding of schizophrenic language. Cameron 
{1944) and Cameron and Margaret (1946) stated that schizophrenic 
language has the following characteristics: {a) asyndesis, the 
speech is lacking in essential connectives; (b) metonymy, the 
language is l~cking in precise, definitive terms, many concepts 
dealt with instead by loose figures of sp~_e~ij.~r other private 
idioms; (c) fragmentation, there is an occurrence of a miscellany 
of discontinious and abortive responses, or of sudden inaction 
that is not followed by the original theme; (d) interpenetration, 
language dealing with events in the external world is continually 
·nterwined with material from the ongoing fantasy of the patient. 
amerbn viewed interpenetration as on intrusive movement, word, 
ovement or thought that appears in an ongoing sequence of act-
ivity but belongs to some other sequence; (e) overinclusion, by 
verinclusion Cameron referred to the inability to exclude from a 
hought sequence material that is irrelevant to the major theme of 
the thought. 
Cameron's last three concepts, fragmentation, interpenetratio 
d overinclusion have been throughly examined in many studies. 
on associative interference, which relatea to fragmenta-
and interpenetration, and will be reviewed first. Then the 
on overinclusion will be reviewed. It is noteworthy that the 
results of studies in these two ai•eas, and the results of studies 
on disturbances of attention and set, which are reviewed also here 
have been explained similarly. Lang and Buss (1965) pointed out 
that schizophrenics have difficulty focusing on the relevant 
aspects of the stimulus situation and are distracted by their own 
idiosyncratic associations as well as outside distractors. 
AssQciative Interference 
Research has shown that schizophrenics• associations are 
• 
uncommon and that intrusive associations worsen the performance 
of schizophrenics more than of normals. A number of studies have 
supported the first assertion. Moran (1953) found that on a word 
10. 
~ssociations that were significantly less related to the stimulus 
words. Johnson, Weiss and Zelhart (1964) reached a similar con-
clusion in another study in which the word association of schizo-
phrenics were compared to normals. Sommer, DeWar and Osmond (1960 
gave the Kent-Rosanoff word association list to schizophrenics and 
normals. Again it was found that schizophrenics gave significantl, 
more uncommon associations. In a follow-up to this study Sommer, 
Witney, and Osmond (1962) found that it was easier to condition 
common association with alcholics than with schizophrenics. 
There is also empirical validation to the assumption that 
intrusive associations worsen the performance of schizophrenics 
more than of normals. Chapman (1958) found that on a verbal 
concept formation task, schizophrenics displayed more associative 
interference than normals. Donahoe, Curtin and Lipton (1961), 
however, found that when nonsense syllables were used there was no 
difference between schizophrenics and normals on the amount of 
associative interference. Downing, Ebert and Shubrooks (1963) 
discovered that schizophrenics were more distracted by associative· . 
ly linked words than by contiguity or rhyme clang distractors. 
From these three studies Lang and Buss (1965) concluded that 
schizophrenics suffer especially from the intrusions of meaningful 
irrelevant associations but not all types of irrelevant associa-
tions. 
Cole (1968) found that with a non-verbal concept formation 
task increasing the number of distractors did not make the task 
more difficult for schizophrenic subjects. However, Langer, Stein 
11. 
a.nd Rozenburg (1969) did find that schizophrenics displayed greate:i: 
interference on the Color-Phonetic Symbol test. It seems likely 
that ·t;hese findings are explained by Buss and Lang's (1965) 
conclusion that more interference is evidenced when meaningful 
irrelevant associations are used. The task used by Langer; Stein 
and Rozenburg involved more meaningful associations than did Cole'~ 
task. 
Lang and Luoto (1962) had subjects learn two lists of paired 
associates. On the second list, half the response terms were 
associates of the response terms used in the first list. The res-
ponse terms of the .other half were also associates, but they were 
not assigned to the correct stimulus term, thereby creating an 
interference list. Schizophrenics showed significantly poorer 
performance than normals on the early trials of the interference 
list. In addition schizophrenics persisted in giving the response 
term pairs of pairs already learned. 
Spence and Lair (1964) failed to find differences between the 
paired associate 'learning of schizophrenics and normals. However 
Buss and Lang (1965) pointed out that Spenqe and Lair's normals 
differed from their schizophrenics in that they made primarily 
errors of omission, while their schizophrenic subjects erred by 
giving overt, inappropiate responses. 
Lester (1960) found that schizophrenics and epliptics showed 
more interference than the normals in the selection of associates, 
the interference occurring because of the intrusion of extraneous 
stimuli. 
12. 
Lang and Buss (1965), in concluding that the hypothesis of 
associative interference had been verified, related the data on 
uncommon associations and external distractors to one common defec· • 
They quoted Shakow (1962) who pointed out that schizophrenics are 
distracted by irrelevant aspects of the stimulus surroundings both 
inner (their own associat·ions) and outer, which prevent their 
focusing on the "to be responded to" stimulus. 
Qverinclusion 
A number of studies have also shown Cameron's notion of over-
inclusion to be at least partially accurate. 
Epstein (1953) used a verbal task called the Inclusion Test 
to test the hypothesis that schizophrenics are overinclusive. 
Subjects were required to underline all words which designated 
things or concepts required for the complete thing described by 
the key word. Normals made as many errors of overinclusion 
(including irrelevant aspects) as errors of underinclusion 
(excluding relevant aspects). Schizophrenics did not differ from 
normals in the number of errors of underinclusion, but made 
significantly more errors of overinclusion. Moran (1953), Craig 
(1967), Kreitler, and Kreitler (1967) have obtained similar 
' 
results on verbal tasks. 
Chapman (1956) and Chapman and Taylor (1957) presented 
pictures of different objects and had subjects sort them under 
specific headings. They found that schizophrenics were more 
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0verinclusive than normals. 
In spite of considerable data showing schizophrenics are 
overinclusive, Chapnan (1961) questioned whether or not the tend-
ency to be overinclusive was central. He hypothesized that schizo 
phrenics were both overinclusive and underinclusive and that the 
issue was not a tendency to overinclusion or underinclusion, but 
rather "a tendency to use concepts of a specific preferred bread-
th regardless of appropriateness". In a test of his hypothesis 
Chapman (1961) used two tasks, one tending to elicit errors of 
overinclusion and the"°ther tending to elicit errors of under-
inclusion. He found that schizophrenics made both kinds of errors, 
These findings parallel those of Zaslow (1950) who had schizo· 
phrenics sort a series of figures ranging along a continuum from 
triangularity to circularity. Zaslow's patients produced two 
kinds of performance, very narrow or very broad, or in other words 
they were either underinclusive or overinclusive. 
Hence, it can be concluded that although schizophrenics tend 
to be overinclusive this tendency is really a manifestation of 
a broader deficit, namely, an inability to respond with the 
appropiate amount of conceptual breadth that is required. 
'-
Attention \ . ' 
Payne (1964) has reformulated the concept of overinclusion 
in terms of a breakdown of a hypothetical "filter mechanism", 
Which prevents schizophrenics from attending to the relevant 
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aspects of the stimulus situation. McGhie and Chapman (1961) have 
made a similar proposal attributing schizophrenic deficit to a 
disturbance of "selective attention" and an inability to select 
the relevant aspects of the stimulus situation. 
Payne (1962) and Payne and Friedlander (1962) argued that if 
there was a breakdown in the hypothetical "filter mechanism" 
schizophrenics should include more details on an object sorting 
task. This hypothesis was confirmed in two studies (Payne, 1962; 
Payne and Friedlander, 1962). In an earier study along the same 
vein, Payne and Hewlett (1960) demonstrated that schizophrenics 
gave longer, more complex response to proverbs than normals. 
All of the above cited studies by Payne and his associates 
were with acute patients. When chronic long term schizophrenics 
were tested on the proverbs test they did not differ from normals 
on overinclusion scores (Payne, Friedlander, Laverty and Haden, 
1963). 
McGhie and Chapman (1961) presented clinical data to support 
their hypothesis that schizophrenic deficit is due to disturbance 
of "selective attention", the disturbance being greatest when 
the patient must inhibit information in one sensory channel and 
attend to another. In an experimental study McGhie and Chapman 
(1962) found that when a sporadic high pitched voice noise was 
< 
introduced schizophrenics displayed a greater increase in errors 
on a visual tracking task then either normals or non-schizophrenic 
psychiatric patients. Chapnan and McGhie (1962) found the same 
effects for visual distractors. Schizophrenics, as compared to 
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·normals and non-schizophrenic psychiatric patients, showed greater 
disturbance in attempting to attend only to auditory stimuli while 
being simultaneously presented with competing visual cues. 
Weckowicz (1960) found that schizophrenics and brain damaged 
patients performed worse than non-schizophrenic psychiatric pat-
ients on a hidden figures test which required subjects to select 
relevant and disregard irrelevant information. 
In a study with chronic schizophrenics Draguns (1963) used a 
task that required subjects to interpret pictures that became 
progressively clearer'with successive presentations. In addition 
to making more recognition errors, chronic schizophrenics were les~ 
able than normals to inhibit responses to the earlier ambiguous 
pictures. 
There appears to be ample evidence to support the assertion 
that acute schizophrenics have difficulty attending to the rele-
vant aspects of a stimulus situation. However, evidence on chroni 
patients is eqivocal, and it is possible that the relevant dimen-
sion is the process-reactive one. Studies dealing with differen-
tial attention and arousal states in process and reactive schizo-
phrenics will be dealt with in the next section. 
Some Conclusions 
The following conclusions are suggested by the research on 
cognitive deficit in schizophrenia: (1) Schizophrenics as a group 
are not abnormally concrete, nor are they abnormally overinclusive 
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rather the concepts they use on tests of abstraction are personal 
~ 
~d idiosyncratic. (2) Schizophrenic thinking is not explained by 
the concept of regression. Differences between thought in childret 
and schizophrenics are at least as great as similarities. Further, 
on tasks where the performances of schizophrenics and children werE 
found to be similar the possibility that they performed similarly 
but for different reasons exists. (3) Schizophrenics' associa-
tions are uncommon. (4) Acute schizophrenics experience difficult~ 
attending to many tasks and their performance is aversely affected 
by distractors. 
Process-Reactive Studies 
The process-reactive distinction, in its general form, states 
that within the category of schizophrenia two subgroups may be 
distinguished. One of these is process schizophrenia; the other 
reactive schizophrenia. The process schizophrenic may be char-
acterized as having an early and insidious onset, with a relative 
absense of precipitating stress. Typically his premorbid personal· 
ity was inadequate, with a marked tendency to avoid interpersonal 
contacts. He presents a clinical picture of flat affect and a 
relative absense of confusion. His prognosis is poor. In 'con-
trast, the reactive schizoph~enic, has experienced a relatively 
rapid and stormy onset of psychosis, usually attributed to an 
identifiable and realistic stress situation. His premorbid 
personality was not schizoid, and he had a history of adequate 
interpersonal relationships. His clinical picture typically 
includes many affective components and severe confusion. His 
prognosis is good. 
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Garmezy (1968) pointed out that Kraeplin, Bleuler, Meyer, and 
Sullivan all grappled with the issue of prognostic efficacy and 
suggested factors that influence the course of the disorder. 
These factors gradually framed the dimensions that now characterizE 
the process reactive distinction. Wittmann (1941) developed the 
original version of the Elgin Prognostic Scale, which was the firs 
instrument designed to.--differentiate between process and reactive 
schizophrenics. The original version of the.,Elgin Scale was 
comprised of 30 subscales (25 measured premorbid adjustment and 
five the presenting symptoms), that were subsequently trimmed to 
20. Each subscale· carried "armchair" weights that reflected the 
prognostic significance of the items based upon clinical judgement. 
Since the appearance of the Elgin Scale, Becker (1956) has 
created a revision that provides for more precisely described 
intermediate points within each subscale thus strengtening the 
likelihood of more reliable ratings by clinical judges. Sub-
sequently, Steffy and Becker (1961a, 1961b) created an abbreviated 
version of the Elgin Scale on the basis of factor analytic 
research. 
( 
The other and now most popularly used process-reactive rating 
scale is the Phillips Scale of Premorbid Adjustment (Phillips, 
1953). Initially the scale consisted of three subsections: 
Premorbid history, possible precipitating stress, and signs of 
:! _____ ....... , J:ll M;!:llillo ..... ----------~----..a 
isorder. Since Phillips found a marked tendency for premorbid 
istory scores to correlate highly with signs of the disorder 
(r=.91) and to a lesser extent with possible precipating factors 
(r=.72), other investigators began to use the premorbid history 
subsection as the sole criteria for making the process-reactive 
istinction (Garmezy, 1968). ·This revised Phillips Scale, which 
was used in the present study consists of five sub-scales: (a) 
lrecent sexual adjustment, (b) social aspects o.f sexual life during ~dolesence and immediately.~eyond, {c) social aspects of recent 
sexual life, (d) histQrY of persona~ relationships, (e) and recent 
adjustment in personal relations. 
Garmezy (1968) pointed out that Phillips Scale has a number 
of advantages over the Elgin Scale. First, it avoids such elusive 
concepts as constitutional bias, low energy tone, asthenic build, 
and toxicity of exhaustion. Second, it demands only minimal case 
history data. Third, the reliability· of the scale had been vigor-
ously established. Fourth, its construct validity has been elabor 
ated though a series of interdependent and independe~t studies:. 
A number of self report inventories for making the process-
reacti ve distinction have been developed (Ullman and Giovannoni, 
' 1964; Johnson and Ries, 1966; DeWolfe, 1968). DeWolfe (1968). 
utilized information gathered on the self-report General Infor-
ation Questionaire (GIQ) to~obtain Phillip's Scale scores. He 
found that this method yielded interjudge reliabilities and 
concurrent validity scores equivalent to interjudge relabilities 
and concurrent validity scores achieved when Phillips Scale scores 
. "' .............. 
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~ere obtained from selected complete case histories. The GIQ was 
used in the present study to establish Phillip Scale scores. 
Since the development of the Elgin Scale, and even more so 
with the development of the Phillips Scale, there has been much 
-
~esearch comparing process and reactive schizophrenics in a wide 
~ariety of areas. General review articles of process-reactive 
research have been written by Herron (1962) and by Higgins (1964, 
1969). A number of writers have appraised the efficacy of the 
process-reactive distinction in such areas as psychophysiological 
'functioning (Lang and Buss, 1965; Venables, 1966), information 
processing (Cromwell, 1968; Pearl, 1962; Silverman, 1967; 
Vaillant and Funkenstein, 1966), motivation and emotion (Buss and 
Lang, 1965), avoidance behavior and hypersensitivity to noxious 
stimulation, physical and social, (Garmezy, 1965, 1968; Silverman, 
1963), perceptual and cognitive processes (Kantor and Herron, 
1965; Rodnick, 1967; Silverman, 1964), developmental theory 
(Phillips, 1966; Rodnick, 1968) familial factors (Baxter, 1966; 
Fontana, 1966; Lidz, Fleck, and Cornelison, 1965; Mednick and 
Schulsinger, 1965; and Mishler and Waxler, 1966), socio-enviro-
rnental orientation (Higgins, 1968a), and therapeutic intervention 
with patient {Betz, 1963; Coyle and Coyle, 1965; Field and Miller, 
1967). Conceptual and methodological issues surrounding the 
( 
process-reactive concept have been discussed by Garrnezy (1968), 
Hig~ins and Peterson (1966), and Raskin (1963). 
The present review will limit itself primarily to studies 
dealing with corr-nitive function, in process and reactive schizo-
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phrenia. The same format as was used in reviewing cognitive 
ieficit in schizophrenia will be used here. First studies dealing 
~ith abstraction will be reviewed, and then studies dealing with 
regression, associative interference, overinclusion and arousal 
and attention will be reviewed. 
In light of th~ review of studies dealing with schizophrenic 
aeficit, it is recognized that this breakdown is somewhat artifi-
cial, in that many of the studies in the different sections are 
tapping the schizophrenics' tendency to respond in a unique, 
idiosyncratic manner, :different from the normal culturally expectec· 
manner of responding. However, the breakdown does provide some 
utility in that different tasks were used by authors seeking to 
tap different functions. Hence in the abstraction section, 
studies using various concept formation tasks and verbal tasks 
such as proverbs are reviewed. Most of the authors who have 
explained their results in terms of regression used projective 
techniques. In the associative interference section, studies 
~ealing with word association tasks and some other verbal tasks 
will be reviewed. In the overinclusion section, a number of 
studies using standard overinclusion tasks are reviewed. And 
finally, in the attention and arousal section, a number of studies 
using both behavioral and physiological measures will be reviewed. 
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Abstraction 
-
Some studies have shown process schizophrenics to do poorer 
than reactives on non-verbal sorting tasks that require abstract 
thinking. Reactives• performance in these studies typically more 
resembled the performance of normals. Parsons and Klein (1970), 
DeLuca (1968) and Donoghue (1964) found process schizophrenics , 
inferior to reactives on a non-verbal sorting task. Brodsky 
(1968) and Berman (1963) obtained similar results with tasks 
requiring subjects to sort cards depicting interpersonal situa-
tions. However, in studies with similar tasks, Day (1960), Roth 
• • (1960) and Sturm (1964) obtained negative results. Sturm attempt-
ed to replicate McGaughran and Mora~'s (1956, 1967) studies on 
open-closed and the public-private dimensions of conceptual think-
ing. He gave the Wide Range Vocabulary Test, the Goldstein-
Scheerer Object Sorting Test and the Revised Inclusion Test to 
process and reactive schizophrenics, brain damaged subjects and 
normal controls. He found no difference between any of these 
three groups on either concept formation dimension. 
Studies with verbal tasks also have yielded equivocal results, 
Johnson (1966) and Murray (1970) found process schizophrenics to 
• do more poorly than reactives on the Benjamin Proverbs Test. 
Meichenbaum (1968) obtained similar results with the Kaufman 
Proverbs Test, and True (1966) has shown that process schizo-
phrenics did not learn abstract responses on a verbal task, 
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whereas, normals and reactives did. Gregg (1965) using proverbs, 
the Goldstein-Scheerer Object Sorting Test and the WAIS similar-
ities subtest found the conceptual responses of process schizo-
phrenics were concrete, but socially meaningful, whereas the 
conceptual responses of reactives were abstract, but autistic. 
On the other hand Judson and Katahn (1964) and Cancro (1969) 
found no process-reactive difference on the Benjamin Proverb Test. 
Little (1966) found that schizophrenics ability to abstract was 
affected by the social context, but found no process-reactive 
differences. Lewinsoltn (1967) found process schizophrenics 
displayed superior abstraction ability than acute reactives on the 
Gorham proverbs and the abstraction subtest of the Shipley Hart-
ford Test. 
To summarize, it seems necessary to conclude that reactive 
schizophrenics have not been shown to display superior performance 
to process patients on non-verbal and verbal abstraction tasks. 
On both types of tasks, almost as many negative as positive 
results have been reported, and there is at least one study that 
shows process subjects superior to acute reactives on a proverbs 
test (Lewinsohn 1967). 
Regression 
Becker (1965) using the Rorschach and the Benjamin Proverbs 
Test found process patients to display more immature and regres-
sive thinking, a conclusion that received additional support from 
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ecker's (1959) subsequent factor analysis of the 1956 data. 
teffy and Becker (1961a, 1961b} predicted and found that process 
schizophrenics gave "more diffuse, undifferentrated, immature 
esponses" on the Holtzman Inkblot Test than did reactive schizo-
phrenics. Steffy and Becker have interpreted their results in 
terms of the Wernerian concept of levels of personality organ-
ization, stating that process schizophrenics are more undifferent-
iated and therefore more regressed in their thinking. These 
results and others in support of greater regression in process 
schizophrenics as opposed to reactive schizophrenics may be inter-
-preted as supporting earlier or greater fixation in the process 
group. 
Kantor and Winder (1959} and Kantor and Herron (1966} have 
proposed a theory which incorporates the process-reactive and the 
regression concepts. Following Sullivan, they proposed that there 
are sequential steps of growth which most members of our culture 
encounter; and that each step contains a central problem which 
ust be at least partially coped with successfully before a new 
organization of experience can occur adequately on the develop-
mental contnuum. To deal successfully with the central problem 
in any given growth step is what Sullivan called an integration. 
If all the core problems are dealt with adequately, then regres-
sion becomes a very unlikely possibility. Kantor and his asso-
ciates stated that incomplete integrations are antecedents of 
regressions, and that failures to progress developmentally are 
_,.......,~..w..w..w.....-.....lll.~~Qphr.enia. The amount of re_gressipn, ?P~d~~"---....1 
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ount and duration of a psychosis is determined by the stage at 
hich an unsuccessful integration first occurred. Unsucces_sful 
·ntegrations at the early stages lead to severe regression and 
rocess schizophrenia, whereas a failure to achieve an adequate 
ntegration at the last stage, the syntatic, might lead £0 a sligh 
egression and reactive schizophrenia. 
In an early study Kantor, Wallner and Winder (1953) predicted 
found that, of 203 schizophrenics, those rated reactive were 
ost often judged nonpsychotic from the Rorschach, while those 
ated process typically produced psychotic Rorschach protocols. 
study, Kantor and Herron (1966) found that life history 
, . 
·a measure of the stage at which an unsuccessful inte-
ration occurred, predicted the degree of pathology as measured 
y the Rorschach, the personality-age-level as measured by the 
orschach, the degree of pathology as assessed by psychiatric 
and the duration of the schizophrenic episode. 
he earlier the unsuccessful integration, the greater is the 
severity and the length of the psychosis. 
Fine and Zimet•s work closely resembles that of Becker and 
of Kantor and his associates. Fine and Zimet (1959) used the 
Rorschach to evaluate perceptual immaturity in process and re• 
active schizophrenia, and concluded that process subjects' re-
sponses were less mature than those of reactive subjects. How-
ever, Fine and Zimet also interpreted their data in cognitive 
as well as perceptual terms stating, "the perceptions scored as 
......... ~t.~e and ma:tJ.~ . ....m.twL~l.§9_ be . ~Sl:~~:r..fil?~~!A~.;;;111-.-a.;;;.s ____ __. 
expressing primary and secondary levels of thinking" (p.8.5). 
imet and Fine (19.59) speculated further that process schizo-
phrenia has its roots in the oral psychosexual stage, and#re-
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ctive schizophrenia has its roots in later stages. In a further 
study using a modified form of Holt's method for assessing primary 
and secondary thought processes from the Rorschach, Zimet and Fine 
(1962) concluded that process schizophrenics function on a con-
siderably more "primitive" level than the reactive patients. 
These results received only partial confirmation in a study by 
Zukowsky (1961). 
Byrant (1961) found process schizophrenics inferior to react-
ives on the Witkin Rod and Frame Test and the Embedded Figures 
Test, their results were interpreted as indicating a "field-
independent, analytical" perceptual mode for reactive schizo-
phrenics as compared with a "field dependent 11 orientation for pro-
cess schizophrenics. Bryant related these results to Wernerian 
levels of personality organization, stating that process subjects 
showed greater regression than reactive subjects. 
Althought, most of the studies reviewed in this section 
found process-reactive differences on various projective instru-
ments, these results cannot be taken as direct evidence in support 
of more severe regression in process schizophrenia. They do 
demonstrate greater perceptual or cognitive disturbance in the 
process group, but they do not necessarily demonstrate more re-
gression. It is possible to view the data which the above authors 
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··disturbance in the process group. The theory of Kantor and his 
associates is lacking in definitive supporting findings. They 
have, however, offerred some support for their hypothesis con-
cerning the relationship between the stage of unsuccessful in-
tegration and the characteristic level of psychopathological 
functioning. However, as suggested by Buss and Buss (1969) a 
longitudenal study is necessary to provide the crucial evidence. 
Associative Interference 
Dokecki, Polidora and Cromwell ( 1965} found that react.i ves' 
performance was equal to that of normals on stability and common-
ality of response on the Kent-Rosanoff word association list. 
Process schizophrenics were inferior to both reactives and normals 
on stability and commonality of response. Foley (1967) also found 
that reactives' associations were closer to those commonly given 
by normals than were responses given by process patients. DeWolfe 
and McDonald (1970) found process-reactive differences in cognitiv~~ 
structure and type of deficit as measured by a word association 
' test. On the Gottesque Forced Choice Word Association Test,Steir 
(1968) found process schizophrenics, as compared to reactives, to 
prefer child to adult responses • 
• 
However, studies by Deckner (1968), Dokecki (1968), Rodnick 
(1965), Schweid (1966) and Ries and Johnson (1967) found no 
process-reactive differences on word association tas·ks. Ries and 
Johnson however, did obtain a process-reactive commonality 
.... 
difference in a subsample of patients hospitalized over five years. 
·This finding could not be reproduced by either Deckner (1968) or 
Dokecki (1968). 
Katahn, Harris and Swanson (1967) found that except for a 
process def icency in learning socially relevant material, there 
were no process-reactive differences on a verbal learning task 
that required subjects to learn a list of 60 words. 
Mednick (1958, 1959) proposed that the schizophrenic~con­
dition is fundamentally the result of cumulative acquisition of 
improbable or remote ~ssociative respon3es. In a test of this 
theory Higgins, Mednick and Thompson (1966) found as predicted 
process subjects were superior to reactives in their ability to 
retain learned remote associations. Higgins (1968b) predicted 
from this theory chronicity as opposed to premorbid adjustment 
should more strongly affect commonality of word association 
responses. This prediction was confirmed. However, Dokecki, 
Cromwell and Polidoro (1968) in a similar study found pre-morbid 
adjustment to be the more important variable. 
In other studies of language and associative processes Husni-
Palacious, Palacious,and Gibeau {1967) using the Sound Test, an 
auditory projective test, found process schizophrenics, .as com-
pared to reactives, gave fewer units of thought and had more 
' trouble integrating the stimulus situation into a meaningful 
responses. Reactives displayed higher cognitive organization, 
were more coherent, and drew more on personal feelings, ideas and 
associations in responding. Cancro {1968) found process schizo-
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phrenics to display more severe thought disorder in their verbal-
ization. 
Deckner and Blanton (1969) using Taylor's Clozure Procedure 
found that process schizophrenics are less able to utilize the 
information available in the structure, redundancy and context of 
language commonly used by others. However, Eliseo (1963a) with 
a task similar to Deckner and Blanton and two other studies which 
sought to test similar abilities by Pearl (1963) using Shannon's 
guessing game technique and by Livingston and Blum (1968) using 
a modified version of: William's worp. strings obtained Y1egative 
results. 
Schwartz, Hunt and Walker (1963) found that experienced 
clinical judges were unable to differentiate the verbalizations 
of process and reactive schizophrenics to WAIS Comprehension, 
Vocabulary and Similarities subtest. In a follow-up study with 
process and reactive response to Wechsler-Bellevue Similarities, 
Hunt, Schwartz, and Walker (1965) achi~ved some limited success, 
but the authors concluded that although the differences found 
were significant they were not meaningful. In still another 
study, Schwartz (1968) again failed to demonstrate process-re-
active differences using process and reactive verbalizations· on 
the Comprehension, Vocabulary, and Similiarities subtests of the 
< 
WAIS. He did find, however, that retardates, but not organics, 
were judged more often as process than reactive. Reactives were 
called normal more often than organic or retardate. 
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Lefeurt, Steffy, Buckspan, and Rottenburg (1968) also failed 
to find process-reactive differences on the Webb Similarities 
Test. And Rice {1968) did not find thought disorganization to 
be any more pronounced in the essays of process than of reactive 
schizophrenics. 
Summarizing the research in this section, a number of state-
ments can be made. There is some evidence supporting the hypothe-
sis that process schizophrenics display less common associations 
on structured word association tests. Mednick's (1958, 1959) 
results•are consister¢ with these findings in that they show 
process patients, relative to reactives, have a preference for 
remote associations. These results however, do not give definitiv 
support to Mednick's theory that the schizophrenic condition is I 
the result of a cumulative acquisition of remote associative 
responses. On tasks other than structured word association tests, 
process-reactive differences were less often obtained. Especially 
notable in this regard were the negative results obtained by 
Schwartz, Hunt and Walker (1963), Hunt, Schwartz and Walker (1965) 
and Schwartz {1968}. So although the associations of process 
schizophrenics on word association tests are more remote than 
those of reactives, these two groups' verbalizations are less 
easily differentiated when the verbalizations are given in a 
more spontaneous manner. 
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Qyerinclusion 
Tutko and Spence (1962) employed the Rapaport version of the 
Goldstein-Scheerer sorting test, to measure inclusion with process 
and reactive schizophrenics, brain damaged patients and normals. 
They found, as predicted, that their process schizophrenics, like 
their brain damaged group, predominately made errors of a concrete 
or underinclusive nature, while their reactives predominately made 
errors of a hyperabst-ract or overi~clusive type. The normals, 
while showing some tendency to pe overinclusive exhibited less of 
an imbalance in error ·preference. 
Sacks (1967) did a factor analysis of various tests of 
schizophrenic deficit expecting to find a concreteness and over-
inclusion factor. Instead he obtained a general conceptual 
deficit factor, a conceptual autism factor, an overinclusion 
versus underinclusion factor and an associational disturbance 
factor. There were no process-reactive differences on any of th~ 
five factors. 
Strum (1965) measured overinclusion and concreteness in 
process and reactive schizophrenics and brain damaged patients. 
He found process and brain damaged patients to be more concrete 
• than reactives, but found no difference for the three groups on 
overinclusion. Eliseo (1963b) found no process- reactive diff-
erences on the Epstein Inclusion Test. 
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Results on the studies reviewed here are equivocal. Tutko 
and Spence's (1962) positive results have not been replic~ted and 
like the studies on abstraction it is necessary to conclude that 
process-reactive differences are unproven. 
A~ousal and Attention 
A number of studiea suggest that reactive schizophrenics are 
characterized by higher resting levels of automatic activity than 
process schizophrenics, and that they are autonomically more 
responsive than their process counterparts. 
Devault (1955) studied the physiological responsiveness of 
process and reactive schizophrenics and normals •. Pictures 
representing areas of conflict, a loud bell and a verbal warning 
preceding the bell were among the stimuli. He found reactives to 
have autonomic responsiveness exceding the process group and equal 
to the normal group. Higgins and Mednick (1963) suggested that 
Devault might have obtained a reactive-normal difference with 
reactives displaying greater responsiveness than normals with a 
less chronic reactive group (DeVault's reactive group had been 
hospitalized a mean 8.7 years). Utilizing the positive relation-
ship between arousal level ~nd psychomotor reminiscence with a 
less chronic reactive sample, Higgins and Mednick (1963) predicted 
and found that reactive schizophrenics displayed greater 
reminiscence effects in a repetitive inverse alphabet printing 
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task than process schizophrenics, with normals being intermediate. 
DeWolfe (1962) found that when process, reactive and normal 
groups were given words and asked to construct sentences only 
reactives exhibited a marked increase in reaction time when the 
words were affectively laden. 
Crider, Grinspoon and Maher (1965) obtained higher skin 
potential and faster simple reaction time from their reactive 
group. Crider, Maher and Grinspoon (1965) further observed that 
the reaction time of their process group decreased and approached 
that of the reactive& as intensity and rate of auditory stimula-
tion increased, further suggesting that the resting level of 
arousal is lower for process subjects inasmuch as their perfor-
mance is enhanced by increased sensory input. 
Reisman (1960), Mason (1962) and Donoghue (1964) all found 
reactives• performance on conceptual tasks to be more impaired 
by distractors than the performance of process subjects (Mason, 
1962 and Donoghue, 1964) or the performance of process and normal 
subjects (Reisman, 1960). These findings were interpreted as 
indicating higher arousal levels in reactives. In addition, 
studies on classical conditioning (Struve, 1966), associative 
interference (Altshuber, 1966; and Higgins, Mednick and Thompson, 
1966), generalization (Higgins, Mednick, Phillip and Thompson, 
1966) and critical flicker frequency (McDonough, 1960) suggest 
that reactives function at a higher level of arousal than their 
process counterparts. 
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impressive as the positive findings. Unlike other investigators, 
Klein, Cicchetti and Spohn (1967) did not find differential proces 
~reactive reaction times, and Schweid. (1966) failed to find 
differential process-reactive reaction times, and also failed to 
show a decrease in process reaction time with increased auditory 
input. 
Vollenweider (1963) was unable to replicate McDonough•s 
(1960) finding of a higher critical flicker frequency thershold 
for reactive schizophrenics. Reynolds (1963) failed to find 
1process-reactive differences with a number of physiological 
lmeasures when he measured resting levels of autonomic activity 
~ when he measured autonomic responsiveness to exercise, a cold 
r~~2.r test1.._and_a gientai. arit .. t!!!!etic task failure followed by 
LOYOLA UNIVtK~ll Y LUiKAiY. 
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verbal censure. 
Gromwell (1961) found no differences in the EEGs of process 
and reactive schizophrenics. Bergson (1967) found reactives to 
have a lower arousal level as indexed by skin conductance. 
Friedman (1966), Rice (1968) and Ward and Carlson (1966) failed 
to failed to find a process-reactive difference in resting skin 
resistance. Friedman (1966) also failed to find differences when 
he showed his subjects pictures of nurturant and rejectin~ patents 
and peers, and Rice (1968) found likewise when he presented an 
auditory stimulus. 
Conclusions 
Summarizing this last section and relating it to the find-
ings from the other sections a number of interrelated conclusions 
are suggested. It appears that process schizophrenics are under-
aroused, while reactives are over-aroused. Hence, whereas 
reactives are very much distracted by outside stimuli, process 
patients are somewhat oblivious to them. This suggests that on 
many of cognitive tasks given to schizophrenics, process and 
reactive patients, may do poorly as compared to normals but for 
different reasons. Reactives do poorly because of their inability 
• to filter out irrelevant outside stimuli, whereas, process patient~ 
do poorly because they have withdrawn and are to a great degree 
obilivous to outside stimuli. 
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tudies Dealing with Brain Damaged 
Goldstein (1939) argued that in brain damaged patients cer-
tain cortical areas, through lesions, are isolated from the back-
ground of the rest of central nervous system. As a result of 
,this isolation Goldstein (1939) stated that brain damaged patients ; 
ishow defective abstracting ability, and in addition when their 
1reduced capacity for abstraction prevents them from performing 
la task, they become r~gid. Their reaction to a problem which 
they cannot solve is to do something which they are able to do. 
Such rigid performance continues even though it is inadequate 
l
and they cannot shift even if asked to. 
Whereas, Goldstein's notion of the loss of the abstract 
fattitude has been disproven in regard to schizophrenic disorders, 
his assertion that brain damaged patients have suffered a loss 
of the abstract attitude and as a result often display rigid 
behavior and an inability to shift responses has received 
considerable experimental support. 
Rylander (1939) gave three tests of abstract thinking 
tability to 32 patients who had undergone partial frontal lobe 
excisions for the removal of brain tumors and to 32 controls 
matched for age, occupation' and socioeconomic status. The two 
groups differed significantly on all measures. Halstead (1940) 
~mpared a group of patients witb organic brain damage to a 
r 
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~ontrol group on an object sorting task. He found that patients 
with frontal lobe extirpation showed the greatest departure from 
the performance of the normal group. The patients with disorder 
in the more posterior regions of the cortex also differed from 
the normals, but the difference was not as great. 
A number of extensively studied cases of both frontal and 
diffuse brain pathology have been reported in which patients 
manifested fairly genera~ signs of impairment in abstract 
behavior as measured by such procedures as the Weigl color-form 
sorting, object sorting tests, the Shipley Hartford Conceptual 
Quotient, Koh's Block, etc. (Ackerly and Benton, 1950; Benton 
and Howell, 1941; Halstead, 1945; Hanfmann, Rickers-Ovsiankiva, 
/ 
Goldstein, 1944; Nichols and Hunt, 1940; Zangwill, 1945a). 
Other studies have shown the value of such tests of abstraction 
as the Kohs Block, Weigl color-form and Shipley Hartford in 
differentiating patients with known. hetergeneous types of brain 
damage from normal controls (Goldsteon, 1942; Goldstein, 1943; 
Greenblatt, Levine and Atwell, 1945; Hoedemaker and Murray, 1952; 
Zangwill, 1945b). 
Several studies (Armitage, 1946; Bauer and Becka, 1954; 
Brown, 1955; McFie and Piercy, 1952a, 1952b; Meyers, 1947) 
failed to find differences between brain damaged patients and 
normal controls on various abstraction tasks. However, these 
studies all used subjects with localized leisons, whereas, the 
above cited studies with positive results used subjects either 
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with diffuse damage or with frontal lobe damage. 
Goldstein (1939) and Werner (1948) found that brain damaged 
children gave more animistic responses than normal children. 
They interpreted these findings as a function of a greater 
rigidity and concreteness which prevented the brain damaged 
children from detaching themselves from objects and events. 
They are thus unable to differentiate between their own feelings 
and those of the surrounqing world. potton (1941) found evidence 
that supported these findings and offered evidence to support the 
hypothesis that these tendencies are a result of impairment due 
to brain injury, instead of merely representing a particular kind 
of intellectual limitation. Studies by Tooth (1947), Lidz, Gay 
and Tietze (1942), Sheerer (1949), Grassi (1953), Battersby, 
Kreiger, Pollak and Bender, (1953) produced results that further 
supported Goldstein's notion of an inability to shift in brain 
damaged patients. 
A number of studies have compared conceptual ~havior of 
brain damaged and schizophrenic subjects. In the studies by 
McGaughran and Moran (1956, 1957) and Leventhal, McGaughran and 
Moran (1959) mentioned in the above section on schizophrenia, it 
was found that schizophrenics differed from normals on the public 
private dimension, in that they gave more .Personal idiosyncratic 
responses. Brain damaged subjects on the other hand differed 
from normals in that they gave more concrete responses. Penk 
(1967) replicated these results. 
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. Chapnan (1960) using multiple choice paper and pencil test 
~terns found schizophrenics, compared-to normals, made more literal 
than figurative misinterpretations, whereas brain damage subjects 
differed nonsignifigantly from normals in the opposite direction. 
Bernstein (1960) compared schizophrenic, brain damaged and normal 
groups with respect to the nature of their thought processes as 
judged from their performance on a conceptual categorization 
problem. He found normals tended to use functional and morpho-
logical categories, the brain damaged subjects used inappropia~e 
and associative categories, and the schizophrenics used bizzare 
~nd rejected categories. 
Several studies have shown the conceptual performance of 
brain damaged patients to resemble that of process schizophrenics, 
while differing from that of reactive schizophrenics. Tutko and 
Spence (1962) found process schizophrenics and brain damaged 
subjects to make errors of a concrete and underinclusive nature 
on a sorting task, whereas reactives made errors of hyperabstract 
or overinclusive nature. Parsons and Klein (1970) found that on 
~ non-verbal concept identification task process and brain 
damaged subjects exhibited poorer performance than reactives or 
controls. Strum (1965) compared process, reactive, brain damaged 
and normal subjects on an inclusion and an abstraction task. The 
groups did not differ on their performance on the inclusion task, 
but the process and brain damaged subjects were more concrete 
than the reactives and normals on the abstraction task. 
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However, Sturm (1964) found no significant difference between 
process, reactive, brain damaged and control subjects on either 
McGaughran and Moran's open-closed or public-private dimension. 
In addition many studies reviewed in the previous section did not 
obtain the process-reactive difference in abstraction or inclusion 
that the studies cited above did. 
In summarizing, it is concluded that patients suffering 
from brain damage of a diffuse nature suffer from an impa~rment 
in their ability to learn abstract concepts. It is further 
concluded that such patients have difficulty in shifting from 
one response to another and tend to respond in a previously correc ; 
way. Finally, although, there is some evidence of a similarity 
between brain injured patients and process schizophrenics, this 
relationship has not been conclusively demonstrated. 
Studies Dealing with Reversal and Non-Reversal Shifts 
Wolff {1967a) extensively reviewed the literature on reversal 
and non-reversal shifts. Slamecka {1968) has assessed the 
adequacy of various shifts paradigms. Paul {1965) and Sperling 
{1954a, 1965b) have reviewed related animal studies, and Sugimura 
(1962),Mackintosh {1965) and Shepp and Tirrisi (1967) have 
' 
reviewed some highly selective animal studies. 
A number of different paradigms have been used in studying 
reversal and non-reversal shifts. Wolff (1967a) listed six 
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paradigms, two for reversal shifts, called intradimensional shifts 
(ID) by Wolff, and four for non-reversal shifts, called 
extradimensional shifts (ED) by Wolff. Two types of shifts are, 
~f course, distinguished by whether the same dimension remains 
relevant throughout the task (reversal shift) or one dimension is 
relevant during the original learning and another dimension is 
relevant during the shift learning (non-reversal shift). The 
six paradigms listed by Wolff (1967a) are: 
IDr - Specific cue response associations are merely rearrangec. 
in the ma1}rler of a A-Br trans~.l"~)paradigm commonly 
employed in studies of paired associates. 
IDn - Similar to ID · except that new cues are introduced 
within the relevant dimension to replace the old and 
these new cues are associated with the old responses. 
EDc - Responses originally associated with the cues of one 
dimension become associated during the shift learning 
with cues from another dimension. 
ED0 •- Similar to ED0 except in ED0 the originally relevant dimension varies on each trial, whereas, in EDc' it is 
held constant on each trial. 
EDn -
Differs from EDc and EDc' in that the cues of the 
originally relevant dimension (and possibly all other 
cues as well) are replaced by novel ones during shift 
learning. 
Differs from the other three ED paradigms in that in 
EDn, the formerly relevant dimension now exhibits a 
single cue, and the newly relevant dimension is a 
dimension is a dimension which did not vary. In EDc, 
ED0 1 and EDs the opposite is the case. 
A seventh paradigm, the one used in the present study, was 
not listed by Wolff (1967a). This paradigm, called the optional-
reversal technique, was first introduced by Kendler, Kendler and 
/: .. , 
Learnard {1962). This paradigm allows subjects to chose between 
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making a IDr or EDc shift during the shift learning, and then 
employs another series of trials after criteria has been reached 
on the shift learning to determine whether the subject has made 
an IDr or an EDc• 
Wolff divided his review into six sections, paritial re-
inforcement during non-reversal shifts, _fumber of response 
choices, age and type of shift interaction, intelligence, degree 
of original training, an~ verbal, perceptual and attentional 
factors. Two of these areas, age and type of shift interaction 
and verbal, perceptual, and attentional factors are relevant to 
the current study and they will be reviewed here. 
Kendler and Kendler (1962) have argued that there are two 
possible models in which to view concept shift learning: a single-
stage S-R model and a two stage (S-r-s-R) model in which the 
connection of S and R is assumed to be mediated by implicit 
responses. Kendler and Kendler (1962) state that the mediating 
responses are assumed to obey the same laws as overt responses 
and are normally conceived of as either verbal labels for stimulus 
dimensions or verbal labels for cues within a dimension, which 
either act as a cue for the subsequent response or function to 
direct a dimension-specific orienting reaction. Kendler, 
Glucksberg and Kosten (1961) have pointed out that S and Rare at 
' times mediated by perceptual responses, such as overt head and eye 
orientations, was well as by verbal mediators. 
The single stage model predicts that if fortuitous partial 
reinforcement of the formerly positive cue is eliminated. non-
r-------------------·--~------........ ---_,..,.,.._...,._....,_ ________________________ __ 
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reversal shifts should be easier to learn than reversal shifts. 
However, the two stage model predicts that reversal shifts should 
be easier to learn than non-reversal shifts either because there 
,are a greater number of s-r and s-R connections involved in non-
reversal shifts or mediating r:~n~.~ses are better able to resist 
extinction than are overt resp~~s (Kendler and Kendler, 1962). 
From the developmental·standpoint Kendler and Kendler (1962) 
argued that the two stage model fits the behavior of adults, 
whereas the sing~e stage model fits the behavior of children under 
five and infrahuman organisms. Kindergarten children are seen 
as· being in a transitional period in which for half of the 
children a single stage model applies and fo~ the other half a 
two stage model applies. Kendler and Kendler (1962) argued that 
this change from opera.ting on the basis of the single stage model, 
as opposed to the two stage model, is due to the acquistion of 
verbal mediators. 
Hence as pointed out by Wolff (1967a.) there are several 
hypotheses relating to the type of shift and age in the Kendlers' 
account of concept shift learning. The first hypothesis is that 
normal adults learn reversal shifts with greater ease than they 
learn non-reversal shifts. This hypothesis has been confirmed. 
Buss (1953) first found college subjects learned a reversal 
shift easier than a non-reversal shift. This finding has been 
confirmed in studies by Kendler and D1 Amato (1955), Buss (1956), 
!Kendler and Mayzner (1956), Harrow and Friedman (1958), Yelen 
~. 
(1963), Johnson, Fishkin and Bourne (1966), and Ohnmacht (1966). 
The second hypothesis generated is that rats_and young 
children learn non-reversal shifts more easily than reversal 
shifts. Kelleher (1956) has shown that rats learn non-reversal 
shifts more easily than reversal shifts. The picture with young 
children has been a subject of some controversy. Kendler and 
Kendler (1959) compared kindergarteners on IDr and EDc' shifts. 
They found no significant differences on these two types of shifts 
However, when they divided subjects according to speed of learning 
the original concept,~they found that fast learners learned the 
reversal shift more easily and slow initial learners learned the 
non-reversal shift more easily. 
Kendler, Kendler and Wells (1960) compared IDr and EDn in 
nursery schoolers and found that non-reversal shifts were easier 
for the nursery schoolers to learn. Marsh (1964) replicated these 
results. 
Kendler, Kendler and Learnard (1962) using the optional 
reversal technique, tested children of 3,4,5,6,7, and 10 years 
of age. As predicted the proportion of subjects choosing the 
non-reversal shifts rose from 37.5% at age 3 to 62.5% at age 10. 
From these three studies the Kendlers have concluded that their 
hypothesis that children under five learn a non-reversal shift 
more easily than a reversal 'shift has been confirmed. 
Wolff (1967a) has disputed this claim. He questioned the 
conclusion reached by Kendler, Kendler and Wells (1960) and by 
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Marsh (1964), pointing out that these studies compared subjects 
~ 
on EDn and IDr shifts, and that this same result has been.obtained 
with college Ss (Isaacs and Duncan, 1962) and six year olds (VineY, 
1964) while a similar result (no difference between IDn and EDn) 
has been reported for 10 years olds. 
Wolff (1967a) argued further that in other studies Cobb (1965 
found that 3 and 4 year olds learned IDr and EDc• equally easily, 
Trabasso, Deutsch and Gelman (1966) found IDn to be as easily 
learned as EDn with pattern stimuli and more easily learned than 
EDn with object stimu1i, and Dickerson (1966) found that 4 and 5 
year olds performed both IDr and IDn more easily than EDs. 
Kendler and Kendler (1969) have rebutted Wolff's (1967a) 
contention that a developmental change does not exist in concept 
shift behavior. As confirmatory evidence of Kendler, Kendler and 
Learnard 1 s (1962) finding, they noted that this result has been 
replicated (Kendler and Kendler, 1968) with a greater variety of 
stimuli (color-form, size-color and size-form) in an age range 
from 5 to 18 years. In addition, Kendler and Kendler (1969), 
stated that a systematic developmental increase has been shown 
in the relative speed in executing a reversal shift as compared 
to a half reversal shift between ages 4 and 18 years in a 
discrimation task·requiring the subject to sort two sets of 
conceptually related pictures (Kendler, Kendler and Markham, 
1969). The third age-related hypothesis generated from Kendler 
and Kendler review of concept shift behavior is that kindergarten-
ers are in a transitional stage of mediational development in 
which some of the children (fast learners) are likely to mediate 
in concept shift tasks, while others (slow learners) are not. 
In concluding that this finding had been confirmed, Kendler, 
endler and Learnard (1962) cited their findings and the findings 
of the earlier Kendler and Kendler (1959) study. Wolff (1967a) 
has disputed the Kendler•s conclusion. Wolff (1967a) in crit-
icizing the conclusion reached in the earlier Kendler and Kendler I 
(1959) study noted Suchman and Trabasso (1966) showed that childre! 
I 
have definite preferences for stimulus dimensions, and Wolff (1966" 
showed that these dimensional preferences determine the learning 
speed in the original learning portion of the concept shift task. 
Hence children whose preferred dimension happens to be relevant 
in the original learning learn the initial concept quickly, while 
children whose preferred dimension happens to be irrelevant learn 
the initial concept slowly. Since the relevant dimension remains 
the same in reversal shifts, but changes in non-reversal shifts, 
it is possible that Kendler and Kendler•s (1959) results could 
be due to the fact that in reversal shifts, dimensional prefer-
ences have the same effect on learning the original concept as 
learning the shift concept, while in non-reversal shifts they 
have the opposite effect. 
Heal, Bransky and Mankinen (1966) and Smiley and Weir (1966) 
have given some empirical e~idence that support Wolff's (1967a) 
arguement. As further evidence, Wolff (1967a) cited Eimas' (1966) 
finding that kindergarteners as whole perform IDn significantly 
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more easily than EDs and Suzuki's (1965) finding that IDr is 
learned more easily than EDc by subjects of this age. Wolff 
(1967a) also noted that in the Kendler, Kendler and Learnard 
(1962) study, although the number of subjects choosing reversal 
shifts rose from 37.5% at age 3 to 62.5% at age 10, the proportion 
of subjects choosing a reversal shift remained constant between 
the ages of 4 and 6. 
Kendler and Kendler (1969) acknowledged that Wolff's analysis 
of their 1959 study may be accurate. However, they maintain that 
the Kendler, Kendler and Learnard (1962) study with the optional 
shift technique does show that there are developmental changes 
in concept shift behavior. They cited their 1968 study as further 
proof of this fact. 
Summarizing, it appears that although there have been some 
negative results, there does seem to be enough evidence for the 
hypothesis that there is a developmental change from greater ease 
in make non-reversal shifts to greater ease in making reversal 
shifts. Evidence that kindergarteners are in the transitional 
stage is weak, but in spite of this fact, there is evidence that 
a change does occur even though the age at which this happens has 
not been specified. 
As mentioned above, Kendler and Kendler have emphasized.the 
value of language in guiding shift behavior. Other investigators 
have stressed the attentional nature of the shifting process 
(Zeaman and House, 1963) or the importance of perceptual factors 
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{Tighe and Tighe, 1966). 
Tighe and Tighe (1966) have explained the developmental 
change in the ease in learning reversal shifts relative to non-
reversal shifts in terms of differentiation theory. They argued 
that if a subject has reached a level of perceptual development 
characterized by the analysis of stimuli into stimulus dimensions, 
he should learn a reversal shift more easily than a non-reversal 
shift. 
Positive evidence for this hypothesis is provided by Tighe 
{1965) and by Jeffrey:-(1965). Tighe and Tighe (1966) pointed out 
that if their hypothesis is correct, then any condition that makes 
it easier to isolate the distinguishing dimension should increase 
the ease of a reversal shift relative to a non-reversal shift. 
In a test of this interpretation, Tighe (1965) administered 
reversal and non-reversal shifts to first-grade children follow-
ing a preliminary session devoted to either a control activity or 
perceptual pre-training designed to familiaize the subject with 
the distinguishing dimensions of the stimulus. It was found that 
the pretraining facilitated learning of the non-reversal shift 
but had no effect on the learning of the reversal shift. 
Jeffrey (1965) found that by changing the constant irrelevant 
dimension (form) from Series 1 to Series 2 and 3 of an optional 
shift task it was possible to increase the percentage of 4-year 
olds choosing a reversal shift from 37.5% (form not changed) to 
76% (form changed). Consonant with Tighes' hypothesis, Jeffrey 
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nterpreted his results to mean that half of the 4 year old subject 
ere initially responding to stimulus compounds, and that the 
hange in the irrelevant constant dimension increased the number 
f such subjects making reversal shifts by reducing their tendency 
o respond to the test pair discriminandum which was positive in 
he original learning. Wolff (1967a), however, has questioned 
, his interpretation. 
l Wolff (1967a) also cited three pieces of evidence dissonant , ith this hypothesis. First, Wolff (1967a) argued that Tighe's 
berceptual-differentiation hypothesis should predict a strong 
retaining effect in the original learning, as well as in the 
hift learning this prediction was not borne out by the data. 
econdly, Wolff (1967a) cited a series of studies that suggest 
hat all subjects, regardless of age, tend to dimensionalize the 
timuli at the start of the shift learning, a fact directly cont-
the Tighe's hypothesis. Thirdly, Wolff (1967a) cited 
hree studies (House and Zea.man, 1963; Colby and Robertson, 1942; 
Kendler and Learnard 1962)as proof that the evidence of 
compounding is positively correlated with developmental 
evel, and not negatively correlated as Tighe and Tighe propose. 
ouse and Zea.man (1963) found that retarded subjects of higher 
ental ages tend to respond more to stimulus compounds that do 
hose of lower mental ages, 'and Kendler, Kendler and Learnard 
(1962) reported that the percentage of subjects using verbal 
ompounds to describe the positive stimulus (e.g. "the big black 
one") increases with age. Colby and Robertson (1942) reported 
that the number of children making stimulus compound type matches 
in a matching to sample type of task (i.e. identity matches as 
opposed to matches agreeing on one dimension only) increases 
between ages 3,5 and 9. 
Zeaman and House (1963) have emphasized the attentional 
nature of the shift process. According to Zeaman and House (1963) 
a subject's behavior on ~ given trial in a typical two choice 
concept learning task may be conceived of as a chain of two 
responses: (1) a pr~liminary response of attending to a stimulus 
situation (termed a dimensional observing response), and (2) an 
eventual instrumental response to one or two cues contained in 
the attended to dimension. Wolff (1967a) noted that the strongest 
evidence for the existence of dimensional observing response is 
provided by several studies (Heal, Bransky and Mankinen, 1966; 
Smiley and Weir, 1966; Wolff, 1966) that demonstrate the existence 
of relatively stable dimensional preferences in: children. 
Further support comes from studies by McConnell (1964) and 
House and Zeaman (1962). McConnell (1964) gave nursery school 
and kindergarten subjects a size reversal problem in which 
stimuli were arranged in such a way as to perceptually emphasize 
one or the other of two 100% confounded stimulus dimensions, size 
( 
or brightness, or give no differential perceptual emphasis to 
either dimension (control). For subjects of both age groups 
arrangements emphasizing size tended to facilitate shift and 
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arrangements emphasizing brightness retarded it. These results 
were explained on the assumption that the perceptual arrangement 
emphasizing size enhanced the probability that subjects would 
attend to size and the arrangement emphasizing brightness did the 
same for the subjects in which it was emphasized. 
House and Zeaman (1962)found that learning curves for both IDn 
and !Dr were negatively accelerated while the learning curve for 
EDs was ogival, indicating that a greater period of trial ~nd 
error learning precedes solution in EDs than in either IDr or IDn• 
The authors point out-that these curves are what would be expected 
if the observing response serves primarily to reveal relevant cues 
and, hence they support an observing response analysis. 
As mentioned above Kendler and Kendler (1962) have suggested 
that subjects' responses on concept shift tasks are mediated by 
implicit responses that are normally conceived of as verbal labels 
for stimulus dimensions or verbal labels for cues within a 
dimension, which either act directly as the cue for the resulting 
response or function to direct a dimension specific orienting 
reaction. 
Wolff (1967a) divided studies dealing with Kendlers' 
hypothesis into five groups: {1) studies comparing the perform-
ance of deaf and hearing subjects on reversal and non-reversal 
< 
shifts, (2) studies investigating the effects of verbal associa-
tive strength, (3) studies manipulating overt verbalization, 
(4) studies using verbal learning tasks, and (5) an additional 
study by Wolff (1967b) that does not fit readily into any ?f 
the other four categories. 
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Wolff (1967a) stated that on the assumption that hearing 
facilitates the normal development of verbal mediation, it follows 
from Kendler and Kendler's hypothesis concerning verbal mediation, 
the reversal shift superiority relative to non-reversal shifts 
should be greater in ~earing than in deaf children. None of the 
three studies (Rosenstein, 1960; Youniss, 1964; Russell, 1964) 
done with deaf and hearing found this predicted difference. 
Lachman, Meehan and Bradly (1965) hypothesized that positive 
transfer between cues whose labels have high verbal associative 
strength should be greater than that between cues that have low 
verbal associative strength; that is, some stimulus situations 
where the verbal labels for the within dimension cues are high 
associates should facilitate reversal shift as compared to 
stimulus situations in which the verbal labels for within dimen-
sion cues are low verbal associates. This prediction was verified 
in a study in which subjects were shifted from black to white or 
white to black (high order associate) or red to white or white 
to red (low order associate). However, Wolff (1967a) questioned 
this conclusion, citing other studies by Lachman and Sanders 
• 
(1963) and Lachman (1966) as evidence that Lachman•s results 
from all three studies support a observing response model and 
not a verbal mediation model. 
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· Nine studies have investigated the effect on shifting of 
manipulating overt verbalization either during the learning task. 
Three studies, (Kendler and Kendler, 1961; Silverman, 1966; 
Woerner, 1963), all using similar designs obtained results 
supporting the verbal mediation hypothesis. Preschool and second-
grade children were made to name two original learning discrimin-
anda with labels for cues of one dimension only. Subjects were 
then shifted to an opposite cue either from the dimension whose 
cues were label (relevant-label shift) or from one whose cues 
were not labeled (irrelevant label shift). It was found that 
relevant veribalization faciliated shift and irrelevant verbaliza-
tion retarded shift. 
Three studies failed to find a labeling effect on shift. 
Kehdler, Kendler and Wells (1960) had nursery school subjects 
vocalize their choices during a ten trial overtraining period 
immediately prior to IDr and EDn shifts. The verbalization had 
no significant effect. Lachman and Sanders (1963) found that with 
college subjects verbalizing overtly or covertly had little effect 
on the shift. Cobb (196.5) pretrained nursery school subjects to 
use labels, which were either relevant or irrelevant to an origina. 
discrimination and subsequent reversal or non-reversal shifts, 
and found no effect due to pretraining in either original or shift 
( 
learning. 
Two studies found that overt verbalization sometimes retards 
shift. O'Connor and Hermelin (1959) required one group of 
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retarded subejcts to label the chosen cue following every responsej 
in the original learning, while a second group learned without 
vocalization. Subsequent performance differences between the two 
1 groups on EDr favored the non-vocalizing group. Blank (1966) 
I found that nursery schoolers instructed as to the correct response; 
I in original learning and made to verbalize the cues of the relevant 
dimension at the beginning of this period performed reversal shiftL 
more slowly than those uninstr~tei and not verbalizing during the 
original learning. 
In analyzing these results Wolff (1967a) pointed that in the 
two studies where verbalization appeared to retard reversal, the 
low IQ of the subjects may account for the results obtained. He 
also pointed out that as far as overt verbalization goes, it may 
have two effects: to increase attention to the relevant dimension 
and to retard extinction of the originally relevant response. 
Hence, Wolff {1967a) argued that verbalization interfers with 
reversal when the number of new possibly correct responses is 
small (as it was in both the 0 1 Connor and Hermelin, 1959; and 
Blank, 1966, studies), but facilitates reversal when the number 
of new possibly correct response is large (as it was in the 
!studies showing facilitation). This interpretation is supported 
in a study by House (1964). 
Evidence supporting the verbal mediation hypothesis is 
supplied by Kendler, Kendler and Sanders (1967) who had college 
subjects sort words falling naturally into two conceptual 
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'categories into two groups, and then required them to reverse 
.the original sorting pattern. It was found that if the original 
·sorting followed the natural conceptual categorization, reversal 
i 
!sorting was easier than when the original sorting did not follow these categories. Bogartz (1965) found that if a subject learns 
one of two responses to half of the stimulus items in a list of 
eves and the second response to the remaining half, it is easier 
for him to learn to reverse his responses to all the stimuli than 
Ito learn to reverse his responses half ~f the.stimuli and keep the 
' 
same responses to the:-0ther half. In a third somewhat similar 
study, Yelen (1963) had college subjects sort cards showing a 
single English sentence under four stimulus cards which also 
showed single English sentence~. All oentences were divided on 
two verbal dimensions: type of name (male or female) and type of 
verb (hostile or nurturant); and subjects had to sort according 
to one or the other dimension during the original learning and 
shift learning. Following an original learning period in which 
either type of verb or type of name was the correct response, 
subjects were given a reversal or a non-reversal shift. The 
reversal shift was learned easier than the non-reversal shift. 
,,, And finally in a study somewhat different than any of the 
other reviewed, Wolff. (1967b) identified first grade mediators 
' !' <· l(subjects choosing a reversal shift in an optional shift task) 
and non-mediators (subjects choosing non-reversal shifts). Wolff 
(1967b} reasoned that if the verbal mediation hypothesis were 
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correct then mediators would be more likely to use verbal mediators 
in solving concept learning problems. He found that although 
verbalization affected performance on the concept formation task, 
there was no significant difference between the performance of 
mediators and non-mediators and no interaction between the media-
tion category veriable and verbalization. 
In summarizing the studies on perceptual, attentional and 
verbal factors in concept shift learning, it seems that for the 
reasons cited by Wolff (1967a) and listed above, Tighe and Tighe 1 s 
perceptual hypothesis ·appears to be incorrect. Concerning the 
attentional and verbal mediation hypothesis, it should be realized 
that these two explanations are not mutually exclusive. Both 
hypothesize a preliminary response, although they diff~r on the 
nature of this response: House and Zeama~ (1966) hypothesize that 
the response is a dimensional observing response and Kendler 
hypothesizesthe existence of an implicit verbal mediation response. 
It is noteworthy that House and Zeaman (1962) took their results 
that showed that learning curves for both IDn and IDr were 
negatively accelerated while the learning curves for EDs was 
ogival (indicating that a greater period of trial and error 
learning precedes solution_ in EDs, than in either EDr or IDn) as 
supporting an observing response analysis. However as Wolff 
< (1967a) point~d out trial and error, according to the Kendlers' 
notion, should be largely centered in finding an appropiate 
mediator, and once this is found, attaching the overt response 
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should be quickly accomplished. However, since the appropiate 
mediating response is already present in IDr and IDn conditions, 
'the mediator should become quickly attached, therefore producing 
a negatively accelerated curve. Hence, both hypotheses account 
in a similar fashion for the difference in ease of learning a 
f 
reversal, as opposed to a non-reversal shift. 
Where the two theories do differ is whether the implicit 
response is a verbal one 0r merely a dimension specific orienting 
reaction (although Kendler, 1964 , has admitted this second possibl, 
may be operating at times). Evidence on verbal mediation is 
equivocal. Some of the negative results, e.g. those with deaf 
and hearing subjects and those studies dealing with verbal 
associates of hypothesized verbal mediators, may be discounted 
by being based on faulty assumptions not relating directly to 
the issue of verbal mediation. There are some positive findings 
(Kendler, Kendler and Sanders, 1967; Bogartz, 1965; Yelen, 196J) 
that give support to the notion of verbal mediation. It appears, 
however, that as mentioned above having subjects verbalize 
overtly can under different conditions help or hinder reversal 
learning performance. 
In conclusion, it appears that subjects make an implicit 
response that faciliates reversal learning, relative to non-
,. 
reversal learning. There is evidence that this response may be 
a dimensional orientating response and evidence that it may be 
an implicit verbal label. It is likely that both attentional 
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and verbal factors are operating in reversal shift learning. 
There have been three studies that deal with reversal and 
non-reversal shifts in schizophrenic and/or brain damage popula- · ~ 
tions. Nolan l1968) used two schizophrenic groups, a concrete 
group and an abstract group. Subjects were defined as abstract 
or concrete in terms of their performance on the Weigl-Goldstein-
Scheerer Color Form Sorting Test. Results showed there was no 
difference on the originai learning, that the concrete subjects 
were slower on both non-reversal and reversal shifts, that there 
was no difference for fast and slow original learners on shift 
learning and that abstract subjects verbalized the correct dimen-
sion more often. Nolan explained his results in terms of an 
attentional model, stating that since concrete subjects had 
difficulty with both kinds of shifts, both the cue attended to 
and their choice of response extinguished slowly for them. 
Nolan (1970) found that with schizophrenic subjects over-
training on the original learning task facilated performance on a 
reversal shift, relative to a non-reversal shift. Similar results 
have been reported with children, but with normal adults, over-
training does not have this effect. Nolan stated the results 
reflect slow or incomplete.learning of attentional responses in 
schizophrenics. 
Fein (1969) compared schizophrenics, brain damaged, and 
control subjects on reversal and non-reversal shifts. He found 
that brain damage subjects, but not schizophrenics, were slower 
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than normals in learning a reversal shift. Both pathological 
groups were slower than normals in learning a non-reversal shift. 
summary and Conclusions 
Research on abstraction; regression, associative interfer-
ence, overinclusion and attention in schizophrenia and process 
and reactive schizophrenia were reviewed. In light of the 
research on conceptual shifts that indicate~ that age, attention 
and ability to mediate are important variables in the learning of 
reversal shifts, relative to non-reversal shifts, schizophrenic 
deficit or process-reactive difference in abstraction, regression, 
~·. 
associative interference, overinclusion or attention could produce 
a schizophrenic-normal or process-reactive difference in ability 
to learn reversal shifts, relative to non-reversal shifts or 
a difference in preference for reversal shifts, relative to non-
reversal shifts. A deficit in ability to abstract or a tendency 
to be overinclusive would impede mediation. Associative inter-
ference would also impede mediation. Since preference for 
reversal shifts increases with age, regression would decrease 
preference for reversal shifts. And finally since attention has 
been shown to be a relevant variable in reversal shift learning 
' 
a deficit in this area would lead to a decrease in preference for 
reversal shift learning. 
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The research on cognitive deficit in schizophrenia reviewed 
indicates that there is not definitive support for the hypotheses 
that schizophrenic thought is concrete, overinclusive or childish. 
There is support for the hypothesis that schizophrenics show I 
atypical thought organization and that their associations are 
uncommon. Research on process and reactive schizophrenia gives 
some support for the hypothesis that process schizophrenics 
display more atypical thought organization than reactives. Also 
the literature in this area supports the hypothesis that process 
schizophrenics are under-aroused while reactives are over-aroused' 
Hence whereas, reactives are very much distracted by outside 
stimuli, process schizophrenics are obilivous to them. As a 
result reactives do poorly on cognitive tasks because of their 
inability to filter out irrelevant outside stimuli, whereas proces 
schizophrenics do poorly because they do not attend to relevant 
outside stimuli. 
Hence it is predicted that process schizophrenics because 
of their atypical thought organization, which will impede mediatio 
and because of their inability to attend to the relevant aspects 
of the stimulus situation, will make fewer reversal shifts than 
normals. It is predicted that reactive schizophrenics because 
of their atypical thought organization and their distractability 
will make fewer reversal shifts than normals. It is predicted 
that because of their more disturbed and more atypical thought 
organization, process schizophrenics will make fewer reversal 
60. 
shifts than reactive schizophrenics. Results of studies with 
diffusely brain damaged patients support the hypothesis that they 
suffer from an impairment of the ability to learn abstract concept • 
' It is hypothesized that because of this deficit, which will impede' 
mediation, brain damage patients will make fewer reversal shifts 
than normals. 
In addition to testing these hypotheses, a number of other 
comparisons will be made. The four diagnostic groups will be 
compared on speed of original learning and speed of shift learning 
The correlations for age, intelligence and education and speed of 
original and speed of shift learning will be calculated. And 
finally the relationship between .diagnostic category and verbal-
ization will be explored. 
A number of comparisons between reversers, non-reversers and 
inconsistent responders (those that choose neither a reversal or 
non-reversal shift in the optional shift situation) will be made. 
They will be compared on speed of original and speed of shift 
learning. The contingency coeffecients for age, intelligence 
and education and speed of original learning and speed of shift 
learning will be calculated. And finally the relationship between 
type of shift learned and verbalization will be explored. 
Chapter II 
Method 
Subjects. Four groups of 34 male subjects each were used. 
The groups were process schizophrenics, reactive schizophrenics, 
diffusely brain damaged patients and a control group of patients 
hospitalized for reasons other than neurological or psychiatric 
difficulties. The members of the two schizophrenic groups were 
all patients at Do~mey Veteran's Administration Hospital and all 
had received an offictal diagnosis of one of the types of schizo-
phrenia. Reactive and process schizophrenics were defined by the 
Phillips Scale (1953). Information for Phillips Scale ratings 
was gathered by the General Information Questionaire (DeWolfe, 
1968). Reactive schizophrenics were defined as schizophrenic 
patients who had a Phillips Scale score of twelve or less. 
Process schizophrenics were defined as schizophrenic patients with 
a Phillips Scale score of eighteen or more.Of the J4 brain damaged 
Ss, 20 were patients at Downey Veteran's Administration Hospital 
and the remaining 14 were patients at Hines Veteran's Administra-
tion Hospital. All of the patients in this group were suffering 
from a brain injury of a diffuse nature. All the patients for 
the control group were patients at Hines Veteran's Administration 
Hospital. The groups were matched for age, intelligence and 
education. Intelligence was measured by the WAIS Information sub-
test. 
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Apoaratus and Materials. Thirty-two J"x5" cards were used. 
\ 
Each card had an ellipse or a circle and a square or a rectangle 
on it. The former are called continuous sided, the latter four-
sided. One of the figures on each card was red and the other was 
blue. Half of the figures of each color-shape combination had a 
number of lines running through it. There was a card for each 
color-shape-plain or lined combination. 
Procedure. The ~s were read the following instructions: 
"I am going to show you a series of cards. Each 
card has two colored figures on it. One of the 
two is a 1 VEC 1 and the other is not. You don't 
know what a 1VEC 1 is now, so you will have to 
guess. I'll tell you whether you are right or 
wrong and in that way, you will find out what a 
1VEC 1 is. 0 
Three series of trials were presented with no noticable 
break in the procedure between the~: Series I provided training 
in an initial discrimination, Series II training in a second 
discrimination, and Series III composed the test trials. 
Figure l shows an example of one of the arrangements of 
stimuli and reinforcements used. For Series I, the cards were 
divided into two groups. In our example, the groups are blue 
four-sided vs. red continous sided and red four-sided vs. blue 
continous sided. Cards are presented alternatively from Group 
One and Group Two. A positive stimulus is any blue figure. The 
first concept learned (shape or color) was counterbalanced for 
Series I Series II Series III 
+ .. /- - + - (+ 
l Blue I ~ ROO EJ Red EJ f Red 
+ 
r ~ .1 ° ! Re~] \ Blue G 
Figure 1. Illustration of one arrangements of stimuli 
and reinforcement used in the experiment. 
°' w 
. 
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all groups. The ~s were randomly assigned within groups to first 
concepts. After a criterion of 10 consecutive correct responses 
had been reached, Series II was presented. If a S failed to 
reach this criterion after 128 trials, testing was ceased and 
he was not used. Six process schizophrenics, seven reactive· 
schizophrenics, nine brain damaged subjects and seven control 
subjects failed to reach criteria and hence were not used. 
For Series II only half of the cards were used. In the 
example only blue four-sided vs. red continous sided are used. 
A positive stimulus becomes any red continous sided figure. The 
S can learn by responding to shape, color or both. The third 
series is designed to ascertain the basis on which Ss learned 
Series II. Again Ss were excluded if they did· not rea0h criteria 
after 128 trials. One process schizophrenic was excluded on this 
basis. 
After Series II was learned to criterion (10 consecutive 
correct responses), Series III was given. In Series III the group 
two cards were reinserted, but no feedback was given for them. 
Group one cams were reinforced in the same manner as in Series II 
The S was told that he would get feedback only on every other 
card. There were 32 trials on Series III; sixteen of these, the 
group two trials, were the test trials. On the basis of the test 
trials each S was classified as belonging to one of the three 
following categories: 
-----------~~.~-----------,·--·-· ____ ,. ___ :::;t~o.:;. .. .,~-----
Reyerser. A S continues to respond to the same general 
concept, shape or color, that had guided his behavior in 
Series I and chooses 12 or more times the specific shape 
or specific color that had been incorrect in Series r 
and correct in Series II. 
Non-Reverser. A S ceases to respond to the general 
concept, shape or color, that had guided his behavior 
in Series I. Instead he responds on the basis of the 
general concept that was not relevant in Series I and 
chooses 12 or more times the specific shape or specific 
color that was irrelevant in Series I and correct in 
Series II. 
Inconsistent. A S does not choose the specific shape· 
or color that was incorrect in Series I and correct in 
Series II twelve or more times nor does he respond on 
the basis of the,general concept that was irrelevant in 
Series I and chooses 12 or more times the specific shape 
or specific color that was irrelevant in Series I and 
correct in Series II. 
After Series III, the S was shown one of the cards, and asked 
"Which is a 1 VEC? 1 • If no relevant response was given he was 
asked, "What does it look like?" and then, if necessary "How do 
you know?". Ss 1 answers to the questions were classified as: 
Correct. The S mentions the dimension that guided his 
behavior in Series II and Series III, e.g. A S that had 
been responding to color states, 11 It 1 s the red one". 
Incorrect. A S describes the dimension that was incon-
sistent with his overt choice, e.g. A S that had been 
responding to color states. "It's the square one". 
Irrelevant. The S gives no response or refers to some 
aspect of the stimulus other than the shape or the colo~, 
e.g. A S states, "It's the one with lines going through 
it". 
Chapter.III 
Results 
Means and standard deviations were computed for age WAIS 
·Information raw scores and education for the 136 Ss in the four 
diagnostic groups and for the 30 Ss who were excluded for failing 
to meet criteria on either Series~ I or Series II. These scores 
I 
are given in Table 1. The means for these two groups for these 
•three variables were compated by t tests. It was predicted that 
lss who were excluded would have lower Information scores. It was 
found that two groups did not differ in age (t=.23, df=164,NS), 
Information raw scores (t=.67, df=164, NS), or education. (t=.50, 
df=164, NS). 
Means and standard deviations for the four diagnostic groups 
. were calculated for the following variables: age, Information raw 
scores, education, Phillips Scale scores, trials to criteria on 
Series I, and trials to c:-iteria on Se.ries II. These scores and 
medians for trials to criteria for Series I and Series II are 
given in Table 2. Since the groups were matched for age, Inform-
ation raw scores and education, t tests done comparing the brain 
damaged and control groups who differed most from each other on 
the three variables were not significant (age, t=.22, df=66, NS; 
Information, t.=.26, Q.f.=66, NS; education, :t_=.36, Q.f.=66, NS). 
Figure 2 shows the number of trials to successive criteria 
on Series I for the Ss of the four diagnostic groups. Figure 3 
shows the number of trials to successive criteria on Series II 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Age, Information Raw Scores and 
Education for all 136 Ss and for JO Excluded Ss who Failed to 
Meet Criteria on Either Series I or Series II 
All Excluded 
Age_ Mean 43.9 46.6 
S.D. 11.6 10.6 
Information Mean 15.5 13.3 
S.D. 4.7 4.7 
Education Mean 11.3 10.0 
S.D. 2.6 2.4 
< 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Age, Information Raw Scores, 
Education, Phillips Scale Scores, and Means, Standard Deviations 
and Medians for Trials to Criteria on Series I and Trials to 
Criteria on Series II for the Four Diagnostic Groups 
Process Reactive Brain Control 
Damaged .• 
Age Mean . 44. 0 43. 2. 45.6 42.6 
S.D. 7.7 11. 7 10.8 15.3 
Information Mean 15.4 15.9 14.9 15.9 
S.D. 6.0 4. 5 4.7 3.7 
Education Mean 11. .5 11.4 10.6 11.6 
S.D. 2.6 2.4 2.8 2.7 
Phillips Mean 22.? 9.6 - -
S.D. 2.9 2.5 
- -
Series I Mean 41.0 26.6 29.6 25.1 
S.D. 36.9 19.9 26.3 27.9 
Mdn. 27.5 17.5 20.0 12.0 
Series~ Mean 26.2 34.7 38.3 22.0 
' S.D. 21.6 25.3 32.4 16.7 , Mdn. 18.5 26.5 21. 0 15.5 
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for the Ss of the four diagnostic groups. In both graphs the 
average number of trials to successive criteria of consec~tive 
correct responses are shown as a function of that criterion. 
Because the distributions of trials to criteria on Series I 
and Series II were highly skewed, Kruskal-Wallis one way analyses 
of variance by ranks with the correction for ties were used to 
compare the four diagnostic groups on trials to the criteria of 
ten consecutive correct responses on Series I and Series II. 
There was a significant difference among the four groups on both 
Series I (!!.c=13.12, df=3, £<.01) and Series II (Hc•13.56, df=3, 
£<.01). To determine which of the four diagnostic groups differed 
from each pther on trials to the criteria of ten consecutive 
correct responses on Series I and Series 'II, each two group 
combination of the four diagnostic groups was compared for trials 
to criteria on Series I and Series II by means of Mann-Whitney 
!l tests. The z. values for each two group combination for Series 
are given in Table 3. The only two groups that differed sign-
if icantly from each other were the process group and the control 
group (~=2.45, Q(.02). The~ values for each two group combin-
ation for Series II given in Table 4. Both the reactive and the 
brain dama~ed group differed significantly from the control group 
(reactive-control, z=2.17, Q<.05; brain damaged-control, ~=1.99, 
.:Q<. 05). 
Pearson product moment correlation coefficients for all 136 
Ss together and for the four diagnostic groups separately were 
I 
~ 
' ' 
., 
' 
Z Values for Mann 
for Series I for 
Reactive 
Brain Damaged 
Control 
**12<- 02 
.. 
Table 3 
Whitney U Tests for Ranks of Trials 
All Combinations of Two of the Four 
Groups 
Process Reactive Brain 
Damaged 
1.15 
1.25 .12 
2 .4.5** 1.48 1.60 
. 
.. 
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' 
Table 4 ' 
-
' I 
·z Values for Mann Whitney U Tests for Ranks of Trials to Criteria 
for Series II for All Combinations of Two of the Four Diagnostic 
Groups 
1 
Process Reactive Brain 
Damaged ~ 
Reactive 1..26 
. 
Brain Damaged • 79 • 09 
Control 1.82 2.17* 1.99* 
*..P<· 05 ~. \ 
{ 
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. computed for trials to criteria on Series I and age, Information 
raw scores and education. The correlation coefficients are 
given in Table 5. The only significant correlations were between 
trials to criteria on Series I and age for the brain damaged group 
(~=.498, n<.01) and for the same two measures for the control 
group (~=. 344, Q<. 05). 
Pearson products moment correlation coefficients for the 
136 Ss together and for the four diagnostic groups ·separat~ly 
were computed for trials to criteria on Series II and age, Inform-
' 
ation raw scores, and.- education. The correlation coefficients, 
none of which are significant, are given in Table 6. 
Contingency coefficients for all 136 Ss together and for the 
four diagnostic groups separately were computed for response 
category (reverser, non-reverser, and inconsistent) and age, 
Information raw scores and education. They are given in Table ?. 
The only significant C values were for response category and 
Information raw scores for the total group (X2=22.85, d!.=12, 
Q=.379, Q<.05) and for the same two measures for the control group 
(X2=24.09, Q!.=12, C=.664, :g_<.02). In both cases reversers had 
higher scores on Informatiann than did non-reverser and inconsis-
tent responders. Contingency tables for the 15 contingency 
coefficients in Table 7 are given in Appendix A. 
For the Ss of three response categories, reverser, non-
reverser and inconsistent, means and ~tandard deviations were 
calculated for the following variables: age, Information raw 
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Table 5 
Pearson Product Moment Correlations for Trials to Criteria for 
Series I and Age, Information Raw Scores, and Education for All 
Diagnostic Groups Combined and for the Four Groups Diagnostic 
Separately 
All Process Reactive Brain Control 
Damaged 
Age .119 -.022 -.316 .498** .344* 
' Information -.145 -.233 -.322 • 062 -.018 
Education -.153 -.149 -.031 -.162 -.210 
* 12. A(. 05 
**' J2.<.01 
" 
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Table 6 
Pearson Product Moment Correlations for Trials to Criteria for 
Series II and Age, Information Raw Scores, and Education for All 
Diagnostic Groups Combined and for the Four Diagnostic Groups 
Separately 
All Process Reactive Brain Control 
. Damaged 
Age • 096 -.162 -.064 .224 .261 
Information 
-.073 -.221 -.177 .086 • 08J 
Education -.160 -.J11 -.101 -.OJJ -.210 
77. 
Table 7 
Contingency Coefficients for Response Category (Reverser, Non-
Reverser and Inconsistent) and Age, Information Raw Scores, and 
Education for All Diagnostic Groups Combined and for the Four 
Diagnostic Groups Separately 
All Process Reactive Brain Control 
. Damaged 
Age .229 .442· .398 .350 .467 
Information .379* .361 .592 .611 .644** 
Education .272 .360 .369 .391 .430 
* J2<. 05 
** J?<. 02 
Ir 
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scores, education, trials to criteria on Series I and trails to 
criteria on Series II. These scores and medians for trials to 
criteria for Series I and Series II are given in Table 8. ·For 
age, Information raw scores, and education the two groups that 
differed most were compared by i tests. None of the differences 
were significant (age, reverser-non-reverser, t.=.21, Q.!=118,NS; 
Information, reverser-inconsistent, t=.22, df=94, NS; education, 
non-reverser-inconsistent, _:t=.24, df=54, NS). 
Figure 4 shoes the number of trials to successive criteria 
on Series I for the Ss of the three.response categories. Figure 5 
shows the number of trials to successive criteria on Series II for 
the Ss of the three response categories. In both graphs the 
average number of trials to successive criteria of consecutive 
correct respons_es are shown as a function of that criteron. 
The number of trials to the criteria of ten consecutive 
correct response on Series I and Series II for the three groups 
were compared by Kruskal-Wallis one way analysis of variance by 
ranks with the correction for ties. There was a significant 
difference among the three groups on both Series I (Hc=25.98, 
df=2, ,l>c.001) and Series II (Hc=22.07, df=2, ~<.001). 
To determine which of the three response groups differed 
from each other, each two group combination was compared for 
trials to criteria on Series I and Series II by means of Mann-
Whitney ll tests. For Series I the reverser and inconsistent 
groups differed significantly from each other (z=2. 97, :Q. <. 01), 
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Table 8 
Means and Standard Deviations for Age, Information Raw Scores and 
Education, and Means, Standard Deviations and Medians for Trials 
to Criteria on Series I, and Trials to Criteria on Series II for 
Reversers, Non-Reversers and Inconsistent Responders 
Reversers Non-Reversers Inconsistent 
Age Mean 42.9 45.5 44.5 
S.D. 12.6 10.9 7.3 
Information Mean 15.8 15.3 14.8 
S.D. 4.7 5.2 4.0 
Education Mean 11.4 10.8 11.5 
S.D. 2.5 2.8 2.9 
Series I Mean 2~. 0 36.8 43.3 S.D. 2 .1 33.7 31.2 
Mdn. 14.5 24.o 26.5 
Series II Mean 23.1 38.0 46.9 
s.D. 19.1 28.4 31.7 
Mdn. 17.0 28.5 30.5 
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but the reverser and non-reverser groups (z=1.80, NS) and the 
non-reverser and inconsistent (~=1.18, NS) groups did not. For 
Series II the reverser and no~-reverser groups (z=J.05, ~<.01) 
and the reverser and inconsistent groups (z=2.96, ~<.01) differed 
significantly from each other but the non-reverser and inconsis-
tent group did not (z=.57, NS). 
Table 9 shows the number of reverser, non-reverser and 
inconsistent responders for the four diagnostic groups. It had 
been predicted that the distribution of reversers, non-reversers 
and inconsistent responders would differ for the four diagnostic 
groups. This hypothesis was tested by chi square analysis, but 
was not confirmed (X2=6.80, .df.=6, NS). The distribution of 
reversers, non-reversers and inconsistent responders for two group 
combination of the four diagnostic groups was compared by chi 
square analysis. It was predicted that the control group would 
contain more reversers and fewer non-reversers and inconsistent 
responders than each of the other three groups. It was further 
predicted that the reactive group would have more reversers and 
few non-reversers and inconsistent responders than the process 
group. Each comparison was done first keeping the non-reversal 
and inconsistent categories separate (3x2 analysis) and then with 
the non-reverser and inconsistent categories combined(2x2 analy-
,. 
sis). These values are given in Table 10. None of the 3x2 
analyses are significant. However the 2x2 process-reactive 
(X2=3.82, df=1, J2~05, one tailed test) and process-control 
8J. 
Table 9 
Number of Reversers Non-Reversers and Inconsistent Responders 
in the Four Diagnostic Groups 
Process Reactive Brain Control Total 
Damaged 
Reversers 1.5 2J 20 22 80 
Non-Reversers 12: 7 11 10 40 
Inconsistent 7 4 J 2 16 
Total J4 J4 J4 34 1J6 
x2=6.so 
df =6 
. 
·' 
' 
" 
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Table 10 
X2 for Each Two Group Combination of the Four Diagnostic Groups 
and Response Category (Reverser, Non-Reverser and Inconsistent) 
with Non-Reverser and Inconsistent Separate (3x2) and Combined 
(2x2) 
Process Reactive Brain 
Damaged 
Reactive 3x2: 3.82 
2x2 3.82* 
Brain Damaged Jx2 2.36 1.24 
2x2 1.47 .57 
Control 3x2 4.28 1.22 .J4 
2x2 2.90* .66 • 2.5 
*12<. 05' one tailed test 
(X2=2.90, 9J=1, ~<.05, one tailed test) comparisons are sign-
ificant. 
Half of the Ss in each diagnostic group learned a color 
concept (color group) in Series I, and the other half learned 
a form concept (form group) in Series I. Table 11 shows the 
means and standard deviations for trials to criteria for Series I 
and Series II for the color and form groups of the four dia-
gnostic groups and for al~ groups combined. The trials to 
criteria for both Series I and Series II for the form and color 
groups for each of th·e diagnostic groups and for all groups 
combined were compared by Mann-v!hitney U tests. Form was learned 
in significantly fewer trials for all subjects combined (~=2.05, 
~<.05}. However, there were no significant differences for any 
of the diagnostic groups taken separately (process, ~=1.17, NS; 
reactive ~=.59, NS; brain damaged &=.21, NS; control, &=1.14, NS). 
For Series II there were no significant differences (all, ~=.90, 
NS; process, z=.07, NS; reactive, &=1;16, NS; brain damaged ~=.38, 
NS; control, ~=.16, NS). 
Table 12 shows the distribution of reversers, non-reversers 
and inconsistent responders for the Ss of the four diagnostic 
groups who learned a color. concept in Series I. A chi square 
analysis of this distribution was not significant. (X2=10.22, 
d.!=6, NS). The distribution of reversers, non-reversers and 
inconsistent responders for each two group combination of the 
color groups of the four diagnostic groups was compared by chi 
86. 
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Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations for Trials to Criteria on Series I 
and Trials to Criteria on Series II for the Color and Form Groups 
of the Four Diagnostic Groups Separately and All Groups Combined 
Series I Series II 
~ 
Form Color Form Color 
Process Mean 34.29 47.70 22.71 29.71 
S.D. 32.51 40.70 10.76 28.69 
Reactive Mean 29.12 24.00 39.41 J0.06 
S.D. 24.54 14. 06 26.44 24.05 
Brain Mean 28.18 31.12 41.65 35.00 
Damaged S.D. 25.44 27.91 32.86 32.54 
Control Mean 22.76 27.59 19.64 24.29 
S.D. 30.36 25.82 9.88 21.66 
All Mean 28.59 32.60 30.85 29.76 
S.D. 28.07 29.52 23.93 26.72 
' 
~· 
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Table 12 
Number of Reversers, Non-Reversers and Inconsistent Responders 
for the Color Groups of the Four Diagnostic Groups 
Process Reactive Brain Control Total 
Damaged 
Reversers 7 14 lJ 11 45 
Non-Reversers 6 0 2 4 12 
Inconsistent 4 J 2 2 11 
• 
Total 17 17 17 17 68 
x2=10.22 
df=6 
' 
. 
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square analysis. Each comparison was done first keeping the 
• 
non-reverser and inconsistent categories separate (Jx2 analysis) 
and then with the non-reverser and inconsistent categories 
combined (2x2 analysis). These chi square values are given in 
Table 13. There were process-reactive differences with more 
reactives being reversers in both the Jx2 analysis (X2=8.47, 
d.f=2, ~~.02) and the 2x2 analysis (X2=6.10, df=1, £<.02). There 
were also significantly more brain damaged reversers than process 
reversers in the 2x2 analysis (X2=4.J7, df=1, £<.05). 
Table 14 shows the distribution of reversers, non-reversers 
and inconsistent responders for the Ss of the four diagnostic 
groups who learned a form concept in Series I. A chi square 
analysis of this distribution was not significant (X2=5.66 df=2 , - , 
NS). The distribution of reversers, non-reversers and incon-
sistent responders of each two group combination of the form 
groups of the four diagnostic groups was compared by chi square 
analysis. Each comparison was done first keeping the non-
reverser and inconsistent categories separate (Jx2 analysis) and 
then with the non-reverser and inconsistent categories combined 
(2x2 analysis). These chi square values are given in Table 15. 
None were significant. 
A chi square analysis 9omparing the distribution of reversers 
non-reversers and inconsistent responders for the form group to 
the distribution of reversers, non-reversers and inconsistent 
responders for the color group was significant (x2=9.90, df=2, 
89. 
' Table 13 
x2 for Each Two Group Combination of the Color Groups of the 
Four Diagnostic Groups and Response Category (Reverser, Non-
Reverser, and Inconsistent) with Non-Reverser and Inconsistent 
Separate (3x2) and Combined (2x2) 
Process Reactive Br~in 
Damaged 
Reactive 3x2' 8.47** 
2x2 6.10** 
Brain Damaged 3x2 4.67 2.24 
2x2 4.37* .18 
Control Jx2 1.96 4.56 .83 
2x2 1.89 1.36 .57 
* .E<· 05 
*-::- E.<. 02 
' 
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Table 14 
Number of Reversers, Non-Reversers and Inconsistent Responders 
. for the Form Groups of the Four Diagnostic Categories 
Process Reactive Brain Control Total 
Damaged 
Reversers 8 9 7 11 35 
Non-Reversers 6 7 9 6 28 
Inconsistent J 1 1 0 5 
Total 17 17 17 17 68 
x2=5.66 
df =6 
-
-~- - ' -
' 
91. 
Table 15 
x2 for Each Two Group Combination of the Form Groups of the 
Four Diagnostic Groups and Response Category (Reverser, Non-
Reverser, and Inconsistent) with Non-Reverser and Inconsistent 
Separate (3x2) and Combined (2x2) 
Process Reactive Brain 
Damaged 
Reactive 3x2 1.14 
2x2 .12 
Brain Damaged 3x2 1.67 .50 
2x2 .12 .47 
Control 3x2 3.47 1.28 2.49 
2x2 1.07 .'49 1.89 
.. 
-
' 
' 
. 
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R<.01). The distribution of reversers, non-reversers and incon-
sistent responders for the form and color groups of each dia-
gnostic groups were also compared by chi square analyses. There 
was a significant difference for the reactive (X2=9.09, df=2, 
R~.02) and brain damaged groups (X2=6.58, df=2, ~~.05), but not 
for the process (X2=.21, df=2, NS) or control group (X2=2.4o, 
df=2, NS). 
Table 16 shows the distribution of correct, incorrec~ and 
irrelevant verbalization for reversers, non-reversers and incon-
sistent responders. Verbalization given by inconsistent responden 
that were not irrelevant could not be blassified as correct or 
incorrect. These nine Ss are shown between correct and incorrect 
in Table 15. In doing a chi square analysis the correct and 
incorrect categories were combined, yielding the total of 109 
shown in Table 15. By combining categories, the nine incon-
sistent responders, who did not give irrelevant verbalization 
could be considered together. The chi square analysis of this 
distribution was significant (X2=6.85, df=2, ~<.05). 
Table 17 shows the distribution of correct, incorrect, and 
irrelevant verbalization for the four diagnostic groups. The 
nine inconsistent responders whose verbalizations could not be 
classified have been excluded. A chi square analysis of this 
distribution was not significant (X2=4.68, df=6, NS). 
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Table 16 
Number of Subjects Giving Correct or Incorrect and Irrelevant 
Verbalizations for the Three Response Categories, Reversers, 
Non-Reversers and Inconsistent 
Reversers Non-Reverse·rs Inconsistent Total 
. 
Correct 63 30 
9 109 
Incorrect 5 2 
Irrelevant 12 8 7 27 
Total 80 40 16 136 
x2=6.B5 
df =2 
; 
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Table 17 
Number of Subjects Giving Correct, Incorrect and Irrelevant 
Verbalizations for the Four Diagnostic Groups 
Process Reactive Brain Control Total 
Damaged 
Correct 20 22 24 28 94 
Incorrect 2 ,' 3 0 2 7 
Irrelevant 7 8 9 2 26 
Total 29 33 33 32 127 
x2=4.68 
M=6 
' 
...-----------------Sl';,J;/.-;'l:.:.l'fW.1'-:1'11 - ~~· --
Chapter IV 
Discussion 
There is some support for the principal hypotheses that the 
pathological groups would make fewer reversal shifts than the 
normal group, and that process schizophrenics would make fewer 
reversal shifts than the reactive schizophrenics. There were 
process-normal and process-reactive differences in the number of 
reversal shifts made with the process group making significantly 
fewer than both the normal and reactive groups. For subjects who 
initially learned a color concept, there were process-reactive and 
process-brain damaged differences in the number of reversal shifts 
made, again with process subjects making fewer reversal shifts. 
In addition, all three pathological groups differed from the con-
trol group on some of the other measures. Process schizophrenics 
took significantly more trials than normals to learn the initial 
concept. However, they did differ significantly from normals in 
the number of trials needed to learn the shift concept. The 
reactive schizophrenics and brain damaged subjects, on the other 
hand, did not differ from normals on the number of trials needed 
to learn the initial concept, but took significantly more trials 
to learn the shift concept. In addition, both the reactive and 
brain damaged groups, but not the process or control group, made 
< 
significantly more reversal shifts when the initial concept was 
color, than when it was form. So when the groups were split on th 
basis of which concept was learned initially, color or form, in 
---------------------------------·--~ ... 
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, 
the color group, the reactives, brain damaged and normal groups 
made approximately the same number of reversal shifts, whereas 
the process group made fewer reversal shifts than the brain dam-
aged group and significantly fewer reversal shifts than the re-
active and control groups. In the form group, on the other hand, 
process, reactive and brain damaged subjects made approximately 
the same number of reversal shifts while the control subjects made 
slightly, but not significantly more reversal shjfts, than the threE 
pathological groups. 
• 
It would appear that because of the process schizophrenics' 
under-arousal inability to attend, they took significantly longer 
to learn the initial concept and made significantly fewer reversal 
shifts than the normal group. Whereas, it appears that the contra] 
group made use of mediated cues thus enabling them to learn the 
initial concept quickly and make reversal shifts, it appears that 
the process group did not make use of any cues, mediated (e.g. 
color) or cues as to the correct response (e.g. red). For the 
process group there appears to be no transfer at all from Series I 
to Series II. They do not respond as normal adults and make use 
of mediated cues learned in Series I to assist them in Series II 
nor do they respond as young children and animals in the single uni 
manner described by Kendler and Kendler (1962) and make predomi-
• 
nately non-reversal shifts. This latter type of subjects accordini 
to the Kendler•s do not make a mediated response, (e.g. color) 
but instead respond only to the correct stimulus element (e.g. 
97. 
red). Instead the process schizophrenic group responsed to 
Series II as if it were a completely new task, and half respond 
to color and half to form irregardless of which concept was 
learned initially. 
This interpretation also accounts for the process schizo-
phrenics• poorer performance than normals on the initial learning, 
and the fact that they do as well as normals on shift learning. 
Assuming that the use of mediated cues facilitates learning in 
Series I, it would be expected that the process group show a 
deficit in Series I learning. Assuming further that making use of 
meadiated cues not only increases attention to the relevant 
dimension, but also retards extinction to the orginally correct 
response, it is possible that subjects who exhibit no tran~fer 
from Series I would learn Series II at approximately the same 
speed as subjects who mediate as result encounter both positive 
and negative transfer. 
Where the process groups' performance, which was characteriz~ 
by inattentiveness to the relevant stimuli can be understood in 
terms of under-arousal, the reactive and brain damaged groups 
I 
difficulty in shifting can be understood in terms of over-arousal 
and perseveration. The reactives learn the initial concept with 
little difficulty but because they are so aroused they cannot 
' cease responding in that manner after the shift. The brain dam-
aged subjects because of their cognitive rigidity are also unable 
to shift from the previously correct response. Hence where 
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ormals have the attentiveness and flexibility to learn the ini-
tial response and to shift when the situation calls for it, the 
process subjects are so inattentive that they are so slow in learn 
the initial concept, and chose a new concept irrespective of the 
initial one, the reactive and brain damaged subjects are atten-
tive enough to learn the initial concept, but get so fixed on it 
that they cannot learn a new concept. 
Whereas reactive schizophrenics and brain damaged groups 
resembled normals in the number of subjects who made reversal 
shifts and differed from process schizophrenics in this regard 
when the initial concept learned was color, these groups' per-
formance in this area more closely resembled that of the process 
group when the initial concept was form. Reactives made sign~ 
ificantly mor~ reversal shifts when the initial concept was color. 
The same was true for the brain damaged group, whereas there was 
no difference in this regard for the normal or process group. 
Two explanations are offered concerning these findings. First, 
it is possible that the reactive and brain damaged subjects were 
attracted by color, which can be thought of as an affective 
stimulus. If this were the case than it would be expected that 
reactive and brain damage subjects would continue to respond to 
color when it was learned initially and would shift from form to 
' 
color given the opportunity. This explanation is consistent with 
the.theory that relative to normals process schizophrenics are 
emotionally flat and that reactive schizophrenics along with brain 
99. 
damaged patients are emotionally aroused. 
Second, it is possible that these results are due to the 
~eactive and brain damaged subjects• ability to make an easy 
abstraction but not a more difficult one. In learning a correct 
form response in the present study, it was necessary to learn 
that the correct cue was one of two shapes (e.g. a square or a 
rectangle) as opposed to one of two other shapes (e.g. a circle 
or an ellipse). In learning a correct color response, it was 
necessary to learn that the correct cue was either red or blue. 
Hence for these subjects, learning red may have made it easier 
to learn its opposite, blue. However, with the form concept, the 
opposite was not sugg~sted as easily. Hence, when color was 
learned, it was possible to learn its opposite. When form was 
initially learned, these subjects did not learn, an opposite in 
the shift learning rather learned a new concept, which half the 
time was color and the other half of the time was form. This 
pattern was not exhibited by the process group since they did not 
respond in Series II in a manner at all based on learning in 
Series I. The normal group on the other hand was able to make 
the more difficult abstraction needed to make a reversal shift 
when the initial concept was form. 
In order to determine which of these hypotheses is correct 
it would be necessary to conduct a study in which color were the 
more difficult abstraction. The first hypothesis would predict 
the same color-form differences that were found in the present 
study, whereas the second hypothesis would predict that these 
results be reversed. 
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The other significant results on the correlations and 
contingency coefficients are of little importance. The fact that 
only 4 of 45 were significant makes interpretation of the sign-
ificant ones a questionable procedure. However, the significant 
positive relationship between age and initial learning for the 
brain damaged group probably reflects greater impairment in older 
brain damaged subjects. The significant relationship between type 
of shift and information scores is slight, and the fact that the 
t test comparing the reversers and inconsistent responders was 
significant indicates only a weak relationship between intelli-
gence and type of shift, with reversers showing slightly greater 
intelligence. 
Chapter V 
Summary 
Process and reactive schizophrenics, brain damaged patients, 
tand normal controls were compared on an optional shift task, in 
which they could either make a reversal or a non-reversal shift. 
It was hypothesized that the three pathological groups would differ 
from normals in that they would make fewer reversal shifts. This 
prediction was verified for the process group. It was further 
predicted that process schizophrenics would make fewer reversal 
shifts than the reactive schizophrenics. This prediction was 
also confirmed. It was also found that process schizophrenics 
took more trials than normals to learn the initial concept, and 
reactive and brain damaged subjects required more trials than 
normals to learn the shift concept. These results were discussed 
in terms of under-arousal and inability to make use of relevant 
cues in the process group, over-arousal in the reactive group 
and perseveration in the brain damaged group. Differences between 
type of shift choosen and type of initial concept learned, color 
or form, for the reactive and brain damaged groups were discussed 
in terms of response to affective stimuli and in terms of differ-
ing levels of abstraction required in learning the opposite of a 
shape concept.and learning the opposite of a color concept. 
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Appendix A 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Age for All Groups Combined 
Age 17-29 30-39 40-45 46-49 50-59 60-79 Total 
Reverser 17 7 19 12 18 7 80 
Nqn-Reverser 4 5 11 8 9 J 40 
Inconsistent 1 1 6 5 2 1 16 
Total 22 13 J6 25 29 11 136 
I 
t-4 
0 
\,J 
• 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Information Raw Scores for All 
Groups Combined 
Information 1-10 11-12 13-14 15 16-17 18-19 20-30 Total 
Reverser 13 5 14 4 21 6 17 80 
~ 
Non-Reverser 12 0 5 2 8 2 11 40 
Inconsistent 2 2 3 2 1 5 1 16 
Total 27 7 22 8 3'0 13 29 136 
' 
.•. , ,. 
..... 
~ 
• 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Education for All Groups Combined 
Education 
Reverser 
Non-Reverser 
Inconsistent 
Total 
1-8 
12 
9 
1 
22 
9-11 
14 
8 
7 
29 
12 
37 
15 
5 
57 
13-16 
16 
8 
2 
26 
17-22 Total 
1 80 
0 40 
1 16 
2 136 
~ 
0 
\J\ 
• 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Age for Process Group 
Age 17-29 30-39 40-45 46-49 50-59 60-79 Total 
Reverser 2 1 4 4 4 0 15 
Non-Reverser 0 3 2 5 2 0 12 
Inconsistent 1 0 3 3 0 0 7 
Total 3 4 9 12 6 0 34 
t..A 
0 
°' • 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Information Raw Scores for 
Process Group 
Information 1-10 11-12 13-14 15 16:-17 18-19 20-30 Total 
Reverser 2 2 2 1 2 1 5 15 
~ 
Non-Reverser 4 0 1 2 1 1 3 12 
Inconsistent 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 7 
Total 8 3 4 4 4 2 9 34 
. 
..... 
0 
-...'] 
. 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Education for Process Group 
Education 1-8 9-11 12 13-22 Total 
Reverser 3 3 5 4 15 
Non-Reverser 2 2 5 3 12 
Inconsistent 0 4 2 1 7 
Total 5 9 12 8 34 
t-A 
0 
a:> 
• 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Age for Reactive Group 
Age 17-29 30-39 40-45 46-49 50-59 60-79 Total 
Reverser 4 3 6 4 4 2 23 
Non-Reverser 2 0 2 2 0 1 7 
Inconsistent 0 0 2 1 0 1 4 
Total 6 3 10 7 4 4 34 
~ 
0 
'° • 
~ 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Information Raw Scores for 
Reactive Group 
Information 1-10 11-12 13-14 15 16 ... 17 18-19 20-30 Total 
Reverser 4 0 4 2 6 2 5 23 
' 
Non-Reverser 2 0 2 0 1 0 2 ? 
Inconsistent 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 4 
Total 6 1 7 2 7 4 7 34 
to-& 
to-& 
0 
• 
-, 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Education for Reactive Group 
Education 1-8 9-11 12 13-22 Total 
Reverser 3 4 10 6 23 
' Non-Reverser 2 1 4 0 7 
Inconsistent 0 1 3 0 4 
Total 
.5 6 17 6 34 
~ 
~ 
~ 
• 
; 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Age for Brain Damaged Group 
. Age 17-29 30-39 40-45 46-49 50-59 60-79 Total 
., 
Reverser 2 3 6 3 4 2 20 
Non-Reverser 0 1 5 0 4 1 11 
Inconsistent 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 
Total 2 5 12 3 9 3 34 
-
' 
... 
~ 
~ 
l\) 
• 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Information Raw Scores for 
Brain Damaged Group 
Information 1-10 11-12 13-14 15 1,6-17 18-19 20-30 Total 
Reverser 5 0 6 0 2 2 5 20 
Non-Reverser 4 0 1 0 4 0 2 11 
Inconsistent 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 
Total 9 0 8 1 6 3 7 34 
.._.. 
.._.. 
w 
• 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Education.for Brain Damaged Group 
Education 1-8 9-11 12 13-22 Total 
Reverser 5 3 9 3 20 
' 
Non-Reverser 3 3 3 2 11 
Inconsistent 0 2 0 1 3 
Total 8 8 12 6 34 
..... 
..... . 
~ 
• 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Age for Control Group 
Age 17-29 30-39 40-45 46-49 50-.59 60-79 Total 
Reverser 9 0 3 1 6 3 22 
Non-Reverser 2 1 2 1 3 1 10 
Inconsistent 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Total 11 1 .5 3 10 4 34 
. 
' 
..... 
..... 
\J1. 
. 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Information Raw Scores for 
Control Group 
Information 
Reverser 
Non-Reverser 
Inconsistent 
Total 
1-10 
2 
2 
0 
4 
11-12 
3 
0 
0 
3 
13-14 
2 
1 
0 
3 
15 
1 
0 
0 
1 
16-17 
11 
2 
0 
13 
18-19 20-30 Total 
1 2 22 
1 4 10· 
2 0 2 
4 6 34 
~ 
~ 
°' . :'\ f 
~· 
,, 
Contingency Table for Response Category and Education for Control Group 
Education 1-8 9-11 12 13-22 Total 
Reverser 1 4 13 4 22 
' Non-Reverser 2 2 3 3 10 
Inconsistent 1 0 0 1 2 
. 
Total 4 6 16 .. 8 34 
' 
~ 
~ 
-.,J 
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